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Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
Daniel J. Hemel† & Aaron L. Nielson†† 
The Supreme Court says that Chevron has two steps: Is the statute ambiguous 
(Step One), and, if so, is the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous provision a 
permissible one (Step Two)? Yet over the last three decades, the DC Circuit has in-
serted an intermediate step between Steps One and Two: Did the agency recognize 
that the statutory provision is ambiguous? If not, then the DC Circuit refuses to pro-
ceed to Chevron Step Two and remands the matter to the agency. This doctrine—
which we dub “Chevron Step One-and-a-Half”—has led to dozens of agency losses 
in the DC Circuit and DC federal district court, but it has gone entirely unmentioned 
in administrative law casebooks and is rarely referenced in the academic literature. 
The few who have not ignored the doctrine have treated it with skepticism. Chief 
among those skeptics is now–Chief Justice John Roberts, who while a DC Circuit 
judge criticized his colleagues for applying the doctrine. 
This Article presents a more sympathetic account of Chevron Step One-and-a-
Half. After providing an overview of the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doctrine, we 
offer several theories why Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases continue to arise, even 
though agencies can avoid the doctrine by stating that they would hew to their view 
regardless of whether the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous. Some number 
of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases might be explained by the fact that agencies 
are ignorant of the doctrine or ambivalent about their own policies, but we suggest 
that there also may be strategic reasons why agency actors might maintain that a 
statute is unambiguous. For instance, agency lawyers with a preference for a partic-
ular reading (or with patrons who have such a preference) might seek to increase 
influence over policy by declaring that a statute can be interpreted only one way. 
Alternately, an agency might claim that a statute is unambiguous in order to reduce 
the probability that the White House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
will second-guess the agency’s choice. In a similar manner, an agency might attempt 
to evade political accountability for an unpopular policy by claiming that the choice 
was compelled by Congress. Finally, an agency might maintain that a statute is un-
ambiguous in order to “lock in” an interpretation so that future administrations can-
not undo it. After identifying the potential causes of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
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cases, we consider how courts ought to respond to the potential for strategic agency 
behavior. We suggest that, when viewed in this light, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
helps to uphold the theoretical justifications for Chevron deference. While Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half remands also impose undeniable costs on administrative 
agencies, we argue that these costs ought to be evaluated against the considerable 
benefits that the doctrine potentially brings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc1 has created a cottage industry in 
 
 1 467 US 837 (1984). 
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choreography. Justice John Paul Stevens’s opinion introduced the 
famous Chevron two-step.2 Thereafter, Professors Thomas Merrill 
and Kristin Hickman identified a Chevron “step zero”—“the in-
quiry that must be made in deciding whether courts should turn 
to the Chevron framework at all.”3 (Some subdivide Step Zero into 
two steps of its own, creating a four-step test.)4 A quarter century 
after the Chevron decision, Professors Matthew C. Stephenson 
and Adrian Vermeule declared that in fact “Chevron has only one 
step”: “whether the agency’s construction is permissible as a mat-
ter of statutory interpretation.”5 Some judges now view Chevron 
as “a three-step inquiry,”6 while others suggest that the number 
of steps probably does not matter much in practice.7 Little won-
der, then, that others throw up their hands (or their feet?) and 
dismiss the entire step-defining exercise.8 
One might infer from this choreographic confusion that we 
now have too many formulations of Chevron, with no need for 
 
 2 See id at 842–43. 
 3 Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Georgetown L 
J 833, 836 (2001). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va L Rev 187, 191 
n 19 (2006) (crediting Merrill and Hickman for the article’s title). 
 4 See, for example, William S. Jordan III, Judicial Review of Informal Statutory In-
terpretations: The Answer Is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 54 Admin L 
Rev 719, 725 (2002) (“[T]he Court erected a new four step test to replace what we once 
knew as the Chevron two step.”). 
 5 Matthew C. Stephenson and Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 Va 
L Rev 597, 598 n 4, 599 (2009). But see Kenneth A. Bamberger and Peter L. Strauss, Chev-
ron’s Two Steps, 95 Va L Rev 611, 624–25 (2009) (rejecting Stephenson and Vermeule’s 
argument); Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 Ind L J 605, 608 
(2014) (same). 
 6 See Alaska Wilderness League v Jewell, 788 F3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir 2015) 
(“[U]nder Chevron . . . we engage in a three-step inquiry when reviewing an agency’s in-
terpretation of a statute.”); Restrepo v Attorney General of United States, 617 F3d 787, 792 
(3d Cir 2010) (“When confronted with a potential Chevron application, we administer a 
three-step analysis.”). 
 7 See, for example, Carter v Welles–Bowen Realty, Inc, 736 F3d 722, 731 (6th Cir 
2013) (Sutton concurring) (arguing that “[i]f you believe that Chevron has two steps, you 
would” reach a result one way, and “[i]f you believe that Chevron has only one step,” you 
would reach the same result another way). 
 8 See, for example, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Review, Fixing Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 129 Harv L Rev 2118, 2154 (2016): 
In short, the problem with certain applications of Chevron, as I see it, is that the 
doctrine is so indeterminate—and thus can be antithetical to the neutral, impar-
tial rule of law—because of the initial clarity versus ambiguity decision. . . . [W]e 
need to consider eliminating that inquiry as the threshold trigger. 
See also Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has 
Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 Conn L Rev 779, 834 n 218 (2010) 
(“The number of steps in Chevron in any given case may turn out to depend on who writes 
the Court’s opinion.”). 
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another. One might also draw the conclusion that a doctrine de-
signed to simplify judicial review of agency statutory interpreta-
tions has instead had the opposite effect. And yet one might infer 
from this Article’s title that the authors, rather than trying to 
streamline Chevron, are scheming to propose yet another step in 
the Chevron shuffle—or, more precisely, a half step. One might 
ask, quite fairly, whether the Chevron dance really needs another 
move. (One might also groan that we already have taken the 
dance metaphor too far.)9 
Although we are mindful of Chevron fatigue, the fact remains 
that neither the one-step, the two-step, the three-step, nor the 
four-step formulation of Chevron captures an important doctrinal 
development that has occurred in the federal courts. In the classic 
Chevron two-step, the court asks at Step One “whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”; if the answer 
is negative, then the court proceeds to Chevron Step Two and asks 
“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.”10 The DC Circuit and a handful of other 
courts, however, now do something different. After deciding that 
the statute is ambiguous but before deciding whether the agency’s 
construction is permissible, these courts ask a separate question: 
whether the agency itself recognized that it was dealing with an 
ambiguous statute. In these courts, a misstep at this intermediate 
stage can be fatal to an agency’s cause: the court will remand—
sometimes with vacatur—if the agency claimed that the statute 
is clear but the court concludes it is not. In other words, the 
agency will lose if it mistakenly says that the issue can be re-
solved at Chevron Step One while the court determines that it 
should be resolved at Chevron Step Two. 
One might call this move “the Prill doctrine” in honor of Prill 
v National Labor Relations Board,11 the DC Circuit case from 
1985 that is sometimes cited as the rule’s origin.12 Or perhaps one 
 
 9 But others have taken it further. See, for example, Northpoint Technology, Ltd v 
Federal Communications Commission, 412 F3d 145, 151 (DC Cir 2005) (Henderson) 
(“[U]nder the Chevron two-step, we stop the music at step one if the Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue. . . . But if the statute is silent or ambiguous, we dance 
on . . . [to] step two.”) (quotation marks omitted); Braintree Electric Light Department v 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 667 F3d 1284, 1288 (DC Cir 2012) (Garland) 
(“[T]he Chevron two-step is a dance for the court.”). 
 10 Chevron, 467 US at 842–43. 
 11 755 F2d 941 (DC Cir 1985). 
 12 See id at 942. See also Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative 
Law, 117 Colum L Rev 253, 296–301 (2017) (discussing “Prill cases,” “Prill claims,” and 
“Prill violation[s]”). 
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might call it “the Negusie doctrine” in honor of Negusie v Holder,13 
a 2009 case in which the Supreme Court arguably applied the rule 
as well (though, as discussed below, we think the Negusie rule is 
of a slightly different nature).14 We choose to call it “Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half,” because—well—that is what it is: a way station 
between Chevron Step One and Chevron Step Two. Whatever one 
calls it, however, we should recognize it for what it is and ask why 
it exists. This Article attempts to do just that. 
While Chevron Step One-and-a-Half has up until now been a 
doctrine without a name, it is nonetheless a doctrine with skeptics. 
Perhaps chief among them is now–Chief Justice John Roberts. In 
a concurring opinion that he wrote while on the DC Circuit, then-
Judge Roberts criticized his colleagues for invoking Prill and its 
progeny.15 To be sure, Roberts said that he had “no quarrel with 
the basic proposition . . . that when an agency erroneously con-
cludes that a statutory interpretation is required by Congress, we 
should remand to give the agency an opportunity to interpret the 
statute in the first instance.”16 But he argued that the doctrine 
ought not apply unless there is “real and genuine doubt concern-
ing what interpretation the agency would choose” if the agency 
were aware of the ambiguity.17 In all other cases, Roberts said, 
the doctrine we dub Chevron Step One-and-a-Half “outstrips its 
rationale”18 and “convert[s] judicial review of agency action into a 
ping-pong game.”19 Professor Nicholas Bagley, in turn, has urged 
that such “real and genuine doubt” will be vanishingly rare. “The 
very fact that an agency has read the statute in a particular way,” 
wrote Bagley, is itself strong “evidence” that the agency “prefers 
the interpretation it adopted to the one that it did not adopt.”20 
And quite often that probative evidence will be backed up by a 
representation—in writing and signed by agency lawyers—stat-
ing that the agency would stay the course on remand even if the 
reviewing court were to conclude that the statute is susceptible of 
 
 13 555 US 511 (2009). 
 14 See notes 130–41 and accompanying text. 
 15 See PDK Laboratories Inc v United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 
362 F3d 786, 808–09 (DC Cir 2004) (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 16 Id at 808 (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 17 Id (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 18 Id at 809 (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 19 PDK Laboratories, 362 F3d at 809 (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment), quoting Time, Inc v United States Postal Service, 667 F2d 329, 335 (2d 
Cir 1981). 
 20 Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 297 (cited in note 12). 
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multiple meanings.21 In light of this reality, the chief justice and 
Bagley would have Chevron Step One-and-a-Half be invoked in-
frequently rather than become a standard part of the Chevron 
analysis.22 
Indeed, regardless of whether one subscribes to the view of 
the chief justice and Bagley, one might wonder why Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half is ever invoked. That is, why would an agency 
ever insist that a statute is unambiguous? From an agency’s per-
spective, disclaiming ambiguity seems like a self-inflicted wound, 
and an easily avoided self-inflicted wound at that. In fact, if agen-
cies seek to enhance their own autonomy (as some common ac-
counts of agency motivation maintain23), one might expect them 
always to argue that the statute is ambiguous so long as a non-
frivolous argument for ambiguity exists. After all, under Chevron, 
ambiguity acts as a grant of discretion,24 and discretion is power.25 
Why would an agency disavow discretion it could credibly claim? 
Yet Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remands have occurred in 
dozens of cases—including in high-profile matters.26 This means 
that agencies are denying (or at least declining to acknowledge) 
that the relevant statute is ambiguous, even when nonfrivolous 
arguments in favor of ambiguity are available (arguments that a 
court ultimately concludes are meritorious). So what is causing 
these agencies to stumble on the path to Step Two? We suggest 
several reasons why agencies might maintain that a statute is 
unambiguous even though such an assertion disadvantages the 
agency in litigation. The first, and perhaps most mundane, is 
 
 21 See id at 297–98. 
 22 See PDK Laboratories, 362 F3d at 809 (Roberts concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment); Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 301 (cited in note 12). 
 23 See, for example, John C. Coffee Jr, The Future as History: The Prospects for 
Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw U L Rev 641, 
702 (1999) (“[T]he occasions are rare on which a regulatory agency has voluntarily ceded 
control without some compelling need that required such a surrender. The usual assump-
tions of political science are that public agencies act to maximize their powers, just as pri-
vate firms seek to maximize revenues or profits.”). See also Talk America, Inc v Michigan 
Bell Telephone Co, 564 US 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia concurring) (“By contrast, deferring to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which 
give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it pleases.”). 
 24 See Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron 
Space” and “Skidmore Weight”, 112 Colum L Rev 1143, 1145 (2012) (explaining that 
Chevron “empower[s]” agencies “to act in a manner that creates legal obligations”). 
 25 See, for example, Burlington Truck Lines, Inc v United States, 371 US 156, 167 (1962). 
 26 See, for example, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc v Food & Drug Administration, 
441 F3d 1, 4–5 (DC Cir 2006) (declaring in a case involving a major cholesterol drug that 
“[w]e therefore generally remand for an agency to make the first interpretation of an am-
biguous statutory term when it has failed to do so previously”). 
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agency ignorance: agency lawyers may simply be unaware of the 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doctrine. But while ignorance might 
be to blame the first time that an agency encounters the doctrine, 
the explanation is less plausible as time goes on, especially for 
agencies that have had actions remanded by the DC Circuit on 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half grounds on multiple occasions.27 A 
second reason is agency ambivalence: The agency might believe 
that a particular result is statutorily compelled while also being 
unconvinced that it is an optimal policy. The agency might decide 
that if a court can find ambiguity when the agency could not, then 
the agency would be happy to consider adopting an alternative 
approach. We think that this too is a plausible explanation in 
some cases, though not in all. 
We suggest here that even when agency actors are aware of 
the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doctrine, and even when they 
have a firm preference for a particular interpretation, they some-
times may have strategic reasons to say that a statute is unam-
biguous despite the potentially negative litigation consequences. 
One such strategic motivation involves intra-agency politics: 
agency lawyers who prefer a particular outcome might claim that 
their preferred outcome is statutorily ordained, anticipating that 
nonlawyers within the agency will be ill-equipped to contest that 
claim. A second strategic motivation involves intra–executive 
branch politics: an agency might claim that a particular result is 
statutorily compelled so as to avoid having to convince the White 
House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) that 
the agency’s preferred outcome is cost justified relative to feasible 
alternatives. A third strategic motivation involves interbranch 
politics: an agency might seek to shirk blame for an unpopular 
policy by claiming that responsibility lies with Congress. Fourth, 
an agency might maintain that a statute unambiguously points 
one way in an effort to prevent future administrations from choos-
ing a different route. 
After laying out the various reasons why Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half cases might continue to arise, we consider whether 
these reasons justify the doctrine’s existence. Despite the hostility 
that the doctrine faces from some quarters, we suggest that Step 
 
 27 The Federal Communications Commission, the Department of Health and Human 
Services, the Department of Transportation, and the National Labor Relations Board are 
all repeat losers before the DC Circuit in Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases. See Online 
Appendix. 
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One-and-a-Half produces potentially important benefits. In par-
ticular, this half step advances the values that motivate (and help 
justify) Chevron in the first place. If agencies are entrusted with 
discretionary power on the grounds that they are more accountable 
than courts, then judicial review should encourage agencies to 
take responsibility for their decisions. Chevron Step One-and-a-
Half can serve to encourage this accountability in an administrable 
way. It can also help to ensure that deference is reserved for cases 
in which agencies employ the expertise that they (at least osten-
sibly) have and that courts do not have. To be sure, the doctrine 
imposes costs as well, in the form of judicial remands and further 
litigation. Neither the benefits nor the costs are easily quantifiable, 
and we cannot confidently say whether the net welfare effects of 
the doctrine are positive or negative. What we can say, though, is 
that the potential benefits of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half have 
been overlooked so far. This Article seeks to bring those potential 
benefits to the fore. 
This Article concludes by considering the choices courts must 
make when applying the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doctrine. 
For example, should the doctrine be triggered whenever an 
agency fails to acknowledge that a statutory provision might be 
ambiguous—or only when the agency affirmatively states that the 
statutory provision is clear? Our proffered justifications for the 
doctrine might counsel in favor of the former, but the DC Circuit 
tends to lean toward the latter view. Likewise, should the applica-
tion of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half result in a remand to the 
agency—or should it also result in vacatur of the agency’s rule? 
Remand without vacatur reduces Chevron Step One-and-a-Half’s 
costs, and yet those “costs” are arguably the doctrine’s virtues—
the costs of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half potentially deter agen-
cies from hiding their cards. 
We realize, of course, that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half fur-
ther complicates the Chevron analysis. The simpler version of 
Chevron set out in administrative law casebooks, however, does 
not descriptively reflect what is happening in the nation’s “admin-
istrative law court.”28 We hope that by naming the Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half doctrine, explaining how it might be justified, de-
lineating its contours, and describing its applications, we can cut 
through some of the complexity. 
 
 28 The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 Admin L Rev 507, 
509 (1988) (quoting remarks by Judge Patricia Wald). 
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* * * 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half with an illustrative example. Part II de-
scribes the origins of this doctrine and explains why Step One-
and-a-Half is consistent with, but nonetheless distinct from, other 
administrative law doctrines like hard-look review and the bar on 
post hoc rationalizations. Part III then addresses a key puzzle 
presented by Step One-and-a-Half: Why do these cases continue 
to arise? The answer, we submit, is central to why Chevron Step 
One-and-Half can be a beneficial doctrine. Part IV then tenta-
tively defends Step One-and-a-Half from its critics by demonstrat-
ing the connection between the doctrine and Chevron’s account-
ability and expertise justifications; whatever one thinks of the 
doctrine, it is a mistake to focus exclusively on its costs while ig-
noring its benefits. Finally, Part V considers some of the difficult 
choices that courts must make when applying Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half in concrete cases. 
I.  ON PRILL AND POLAR BEARS 
We begin by describing Chevron Step One-and-a-Half’s applica-
tion in a particular case—not because it is an exceptional example 
of the doctrine, but because it is an entirely ordinary example.29 The 
 
 29 The DC Circuit has ruled against an agency on Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
grounds in each of the following cases: 
NextEra Desert Center Blythe, LLC v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
2017 WL 1228577, *3–4 (DC Cir); 
United States v Ross, 2017 WL 728040, *4–5 (DC Cir); 
Noble Energy, Inc v Salazar, 671 F3d 1241, 1245–46 (DC Cir 2012); 
PSEG Energy Resources & Trade LLC v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
665 F3d 203, 208–10 (DC Cir 2011); 
United States Postal Service v Postal Regulatory Commission, 640 F3d 1263, 
1268 (DC Cir 2011); 
Prime Time International Co v Vilsack, 599 F3d 678, 683 (DC Cir 2010); 
Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration v National Cement Co of California, 
494 F3d 1066, 1073–75 (DC Cir 2007); 
Menkes v Department of Homeland Security, 486 F3d 1307, 1313–14 (DC Cir 2007); 
Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc v Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 471 F3d 
1350, 1353–54 (DC Cir 2006); 
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc v Food & Drug Administration, 441 F3d 1, 4–5 
(DC Cir 2006); 
PDK Laboratories Inc v United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362 
F3d 786, 797–98 (DC Cir 2004); 
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Endangered Species Act of 197330 (ESA) defines an “endangered 
species” as “any species which is in danger of extinction through-
out all or a significant portion of its range.”31 The Act does not 
address, however, whether a species is “endangered” when the 
 
Arizona v Thompson, 281 F3d 248, 259–60 (DC Cir 2002); 
ITT Industries, Inc v National Labor Relations Board, 251 F3d 995, 1004–05 
(DC Cir 2001); 
Jacoby v National Labor Relations Board, 233 F3d 611, 617 (DC Cir 2000); 
GTE Service Corp v Federal Communications Commission, 224 F3d 768, 775–76 
(DC Cir 2000); 
Transitional Hospitals Corp of Louisiana, Inc v Shalala, 222 F3d 1019, 1029 (DC 
Cir 2000); 
PanAmSat Corp v Federal Communications Commission, 198 F3d 890, 896–97 
(DC Cir 1999); 
Sea–Land Service, Inc v Department of Transportation, 137 F3d 640, 646–47 (DC 
Cir 1998); 
Alarm Industry Communications Committee v Federal Communications 
Commission, 131 F3d 1066, 1071–72 (DC Cir 1997); 
City of Los Angeles Department of Airports v United States Department of 
Transportation, 103 F3d 1027, 1033–34 (DC Cir 1997); 
Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
924 F2d 1132, 1135–37 (DC Cir 1991); 
American Petroleum Institute v United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
906 F2d 729, 740 (DC Cir 1990) (per curiam); 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co v Interstate Commerce Commission, 826 F2d 
1125, 1129 (DC Cir 1987); 
Phillips Petroleum Co v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 792 F2d 1165, 
1169–70, 1172 (DC Cir 1986); 
Prill, 755 F2d at 942. 
The list is nonexhaustive and does not include cases in which the DC federal district court 
invoked Chevron Step One-and-a-Half and the agency did not press an appeal before the 
DC Circuit. See, for example, American Petroleum Institute v Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 953 F Supp 2d 5, 13 (DDC 2013); International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association v United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 887 F Supp 2d 259, 
280–82 (DDC 2012); Coalition for Common Sense in Government Procurement v United 
States, 671 F Supp 2d 48, 55–56 (DDC 2009). Nor does it include cases in other circuits 
applying the doctrine. See notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
Note, moreover, that the total number of cases in which an agency interpretation 
fails at Chevron Step Two is quite small. Reviewing all published Chevron decisions from 
the courts of appeals in 2011, Professor Richard Re identified only two instances in which 
the court ruled against the agency specifically at Step Two. See Re, 89 Ind L J at 638, 640 
(cited in note 5). Professors Kent Barnett and Christopher J. Walker identified fewer than 
five Step Two invalidations per year in a review of circuit court cases between 2003 and 
2013, with the DC Circuit accounting for less than a fifth of all Chevron cases in the courts 
of appeals. See Kent Barnett and Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 115 
Mich L Rev *25–26, 31–32 (forthcoming 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/DG5V-SH82. 
 30 Pub L No 93-205, 87 Stat 884, codified as amended at 16 USC § 1531 et seq. 
 31 ESA § 3(4), 87 Stat at 885, codified at 16 USC § 1532(6). 
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possibility of extinction is far off in the future. (Or at least, the 
Act arguably does not address that question; more on this below.) 
The question is particularly significant with respect to polar 
bears, whose very survival may be affected by losses of sea ice 
over the next century.32 
The US Fish and Wildlife Service, which administers the 
ESA with respect to land animals,33 concluded in a May 2008 final 
rule that polar bears are “threatened” but not “endangered.”34 
(The term “threatened species” in the ESA refers to “any species 
which is likely to become an endangered species within the fore-
seeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its 
range.”)35 While acknowledging that projected changes in future 
sea ice conditions pose a danger to the polar bear’s survival in the 
long run, the Service contended that the “plain language” of the 
ESA showed that an “endangered” species must face a “substan-
tial and immediate” risk of extinction, whereas a “threatened” 
species is one that faces a “less imminent” danger.36 Shortly after 
the Service issued its final rule, complete with this temporal dis-
tinction, the Center for Biological Diversity and other environ-
mental groups sued the Service in federal district court in the 
District of Columbia for failing to classify polar bears as endan-
gered.37 The environmental groups argued that the Service had 
misinterpreted the ESA by reading an imminence requirement 
into the definition of endangered.38 
 
 32 See Arthur Neslen, Climate Change Is ‘Single Biggest Threat’ to Polar Bear Sur-
vival (The Guardian, Nov 18, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Z57U-EDF5. 
 33 On the division of responsibility between the Interior Department’s Fish and 
Wildlife Service and the Commerce Department’s National Marine Fisheries Service, see 
Hawksbill Sea Turtle v Federal Emergency Management Agency, 126 F3d 461, 470–71 (3d 
Cir 1997). 
 34 Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered and Threat-
ened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus 
maritimus) throughout Its Range, 73 Fed Reg 28212, 28212 (2008), amending 50 CFR 
Part 17. 
 35 ESA § 3(15), 87 Stat at 886, codified at 16 USC § 1532(20). 
 36 In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, 748 F 
Supp 2d 19, 24, 26 (DDC 2010). 
 37 A number of other plaintiffs, including the state of Alaska and Safari Club 
International, sued the Service arguing that polar bears did not meet the definition of 
“threatened.” Id at 20–21. 
 38 See Third Amended Complaint of Plaintiffs Center for Biological Diversity, Natural 
Resources Defence Council and Greenpeace, Inc, In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act 
Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, Misc Action No 08-0764, *28 (DDC filed Mar 13, 2009) 
(claiming that “[t]he Secretary’s failure to list the polar bear as ‘endangered’” was in part 
because he “applied the wrong legal standards in making his determination”). 
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Readers familiar with foundational principles of administra-
tive law might expect that this case would be resolved on the basis 
of the Chevron doctrine. And indeed, that is where the district 
court began: 
The framework for reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute that the agency is charged with administering is set 
forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. The first step in this review process is for the 
court to determine whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is 
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress. . . . If the court concludes that the statute 
is either silent or ambiguous with respect to the precise ques-
tion at issue, the second step of the court’s review process is 
to determine whether the interpretation proffered by the 
agency is based on a permissible construction of the statute.39 
The district court then examined the “text, structure, and 
legislative history of the ESA” and determined that “the statute 
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” in the case: 
whether an endangered species must be in danger of imminent ex-
tinction.40 And recall what the court had just said about Chevron: 
if the statute is “silent or ambiguous” on the specific issue, then 
the court proceeds to the second step and determines whether 
the agency’s interpretation of the statute is “permissible.” One 
might assume, then, that the district court would proceed to the 
second step of the Chevron analysis. But that assumption would 
be incorrect. 
The district court did not reach Chevron Step Two. (Or, at 
least, it did not reach Chevron Step Two for another year.) In-
stead, it said: 
Upon finding the definition of an endangered species to be 
ambiguous, the Court would normally be required to defer 
to any permissible agency construction of the statute under 
step two of the Chevron analysis. In this case, however, 
there is no permissible construction to which the Court can 
defer. . . . [The Fish and Wildlife Service] relies exclusively 
on a plain-meaning interpretation of the ESA. As Chevron 
 
 39 In re Polar Bear, 748 F Supp 2d at 24–25 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 40 Id at 28–29 (quotation marks omitted). 
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step 2 deference is reserved for those instances when an 
agency recognizes that the Congress’s intent is not plain from 
the statute’s face, this Court is precluded from according the 
agency’s interpretation deference under Chevron.41 
The district court’s key analytical move was to say that def-
erence at Chevron Step Two is reserved for instances in which the 
agency “recognizes” the ambiguity in the statute. Significantly, 
the district court cited no Supreme Court precedent for this prop-
osition.42 Instead, it relied on a DC Circuit precedent, Peter Pan 
Bus Lines, Inc v Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,43 
which itself invoked a line of DC Circuit cases dating back to the 
1985 case Prill.44 The district court then remanded the case back 
to the Fish and Wildlife Service for the agency to decide whether 
to adopt the same imminence requirement as a matter of its own 
discretion.45 
The rest of the story is perhaps predictable. Following the 
district court’s remand order, the Fish and Wildlife Service sub-
mitted a memorandum of “supplemental explanation” stating 
that even if the statutory definition of endangered is ambiguous, 
it still hewed to the view that the classification should be limited 
to species facing an immediate risk of extinction.46 In a section titled 
“The Policies and Purposes of the ESA,” the Service explained that 
“species currently on the brink of extinction . . . generally need 
stringent protection,” which the endangered classification pro-
vides.47 But 
[f]or species not yet on the brink of extinction, particularly 
for those that have yet to experience any notable decline in 
numbers or range, [the “threatened” classification] offers the 
flexibility to fashion restrictions according to the needs of the 
species, which reflects the generally longer time frames avail-
able to test differing conservation strategies.48 
 
 41 Id at 29 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 42 See id. 
 43 471 F3d 1350 (DC Cir 2006). See also In re Polar Bear, 748 F Supp 2d at 29, citing 
Peter Pan, 471 F3d at 1354. 
 44 Peter Pan, 471 F3d at 1354. 
 45 In re Polar Bear, 748 F Supp 2d at 29–30. 
 46 See generally Memorandum: Supplemental Explanation for the Legal Basis of the 
Department’s May 15, 2008, Determination of Threatened Status for Polar Bears, In re 
Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, Misc Action No 08-
0764 (DDC filed Dec 22, 2010). 
 47 Id at *7–8. 
 48 Id at *8. 
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The case went back to the district court, which concluded that “the 
agency’s Supplemental Explanation sufficiently demonstrates 
that the Service’s definition of an endangered species, as applied 
to the polar bear, represents a permissible construction of the 
ESA and must be upheld under step two of the Chevron frame-
work.”49 The DC Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling,50 and 
the polar bear is still listed as threatened but not endangered.51 
While the outcome of the polar bear post-remand saga may 
not be surprising, much else about the story is puzzling. For one: 
Why did the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half question arise in the 
first place? Why didn’t the Fish and Wildlife Service insert a dis-
claimer in its listing rule along the following lines: “We think the 
plain meaning of ‘endangered’ is that the danger of extinction 
must be imminent, but even if we are wrong on that score and the 
statute is ambiguous, we would arrive at the same result in the 
exercise of our discretion”? This sort of disclaimer does not appear 
to be uncommon,52 and yet the Service omitted it here. Why? It is 
 
 49 In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, 794 F 
Supp 2d 65, 90 (DDC 2011). 
 50 See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule 
Litigation, 709 F3d 1, 3 (DC Cir 2013). 
 51 Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) (US Fish and Wildlife Service), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7ZEG-6RZ9. 
 52 See, for example, Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, Endangered and Threatened Species; Identification of 14 Distinct Popu-
lation Segments of the Humpback Whale (Megaptera novaeangliae) and Proposed Revision 
of Species-Wide Listing, 80 Fed Reg 22304, 22348 (2015), amending 50 CFR Parts 223–24 
(“To the extent it may be said that the statute is ambiguous as to precisely how the up-
dated listings should replace the original listing in such circumstances, we provide our 
interpretation of the statutory scheme.”); Department of Veterans Affairs, Health Care for 
Homeless Veterans Program, 76 Fed Reg 52575, 52577 (2011), amending 38 CFR Part 63 
(“Even if the statute is ambiguous, our interpretation that it applies to veterans who are 
homeless and have a serious mental illness is consistent with Congress’ intent.”); Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare 
Program; Payment Policies under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to 
Part B for CY 2009; E-prescribing Exemption for Computer-Generated Facsimile Trans-
missions; and Payment for Certain Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, 
and Supplies (DMEPOS), 73 Fed Reg 69726, 69911 (2008), amending various sections of 
CFR Title 42 (“First, we continue to believe that our interpretation is consistent with the 
plain language of the Medicare statute, and alternatively, if the statute is ambiguous to 
this point, we believe our interpretation best captures the Congress’ intent and is a rea-
sonable and permissible interpretation.”); Department of Health and Human Services, 
Health Care Financing Administration, Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital In-
patient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year 1998 Rates, 63 Fed Reg 26318, 
26346 (1998), amending various sections of CFR Title 42: 
Taking into consideration the statutory language, the statutory scheme, and 
the legislative history, we believe the best reading of the statute enacted by the 
Congress is that we should calculate a single number for hospitals within each 
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easy to understand how a Step One-and-a-Half issue might arise 
if no one had ever thought about this issue before, but the DC 
Circuit has been applying this doctrine for three decades. Prill, 
after all, was decided in 1985 and has been applied many times 
in the intervening years.53 Wouldn’t one expect that agencies, af-
ter decades of litigation experience, would get the message and 
start to insert disclaimers of this sort in their rules as a matter of 
course? 
And on a normative note: What use does Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half serve? In the polar bear case, did the district court really 
anticipate that, on remand, the Fish and Wildlife Service would 
say: “Gee, now that we know that the statute is ambiguous, we 
think that the term ‘endangered’ should apply to risks far off in 
the future and polar bears should be listed as ‘endangered’ going 
forward”? If the Service had wanted to list polar bears as “endan-
gered,” presumably it would have found in the statute the ambi-
guity so apparent to the district court. Agency officials and lawyers, 
after all, are pretty good at searching for ambiguity and, indeed, 
are often willing to press aggressive arguments in favor of it.54 So 
the district court surely suspected that the statutory interpreta-
tion adopted by the agency also reflected the agency’s view of the 
best policy. Did it warrant an extra round of litigation just so that 
the Fish and Wildlife Service would say so in more explicit terms? 
Especially in light of this example, we understand why some 
readers might conclude that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is non-
sense twice over—nonsense in that no sensible agency should 
ever find itself ensnared by the doctrine, and nonsense in that the 
doctrine itself accomplishes absolutely nothing. And yet we resist 
those conclusions. In Part III, we explain why a rational agency 
(or rational actors within the agency) might deliberately choose 
to argue that a statute is unambiguous without attaching any dis-
claimer (that is, without arguing in the alternative that even if 
the statute is ambiguous, the agency’s construction is permissi-
ble). And in Part IV, we explain why in our view Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half can produce benefits even if, in the mine-run of 
cases, a remand to the agency will result in the agency spitting 
back the same rule with cosmetic changes to the preamble. But 
 
class and not apply a wage adjustment. We believe that, in any event, the Sec-
retary’s policy is consistent with the statute and is reasonable. 
 53 See note 29. 
 54 See, for example, Wachtel v Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F2d 581, 585 (DC Cir 
1993) (rejecting the agency’s argument in favor of ambiguity as “almost frivolous”). 
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before doing so, we seek to situate Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
in its doctrinal context. 
II.  DOCTRINAL ANTECEDENTS OF CHEVRON STEP ONE-AND-A-
HALF 
To appreciate Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, it is necessary 
to understand three administrative law doctrines (doctrines no 
doubt familiar to many readers): Chevron, Securities and Ex-
change Commission v Chenery Corp55 (“Chenery I”), and Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc v 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.56 We argue that 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is consistent with each of these doc-
trines but not necessarily dictated by any one of them. 
A. Chevron 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc 
is by most measures the most frequently cited case in administra-
tive law.57 It is certainly the most familiar to administrative law 
students.58 And at first blush, it is among the most straightfor-
ward. Chevron calls on courts to apply a two-step framework 
when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it 
administers. The Court in Chevron articulated the two steps as 
follows: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute 
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, 
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is 
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the 
 
 55 318 US 80 (1943). 
 56 463 US 29 (1983). 
 57 By most measures, but not by all: Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800 (1982), is ar-
guably an “admin law” case, and it has been cited more frequently than Chevron. See Chris 
Walker, Most Cited Supreme Court Administrative Law Decisions (Notice & Comment, Oct 
9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/J26H-QVBW. And if one counts Daubert v Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 509 US 579 (1993), and we don’t, Daubert comes out on top. 
Walker, Most Cited Supreme Court Administrative Law Decisions (cited in note 57). 
 58 See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi 
Kent L Rev 1253, 1253 (1997) (noting that Chevron “pervades the administrative law 
courses and lodges in the consciousness of impressionable students”). 
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court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an adminis-
trative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute.59 
The Court—per Justice Stevens—attempted to justify this 
deference in at least three ways: political accountability, compar-
ative expertise, and implied delegation, with the first two being 
the most important in Stevens’s analysis. As to accountability, 
Stevens reasoned that when a statute is ambiguous, it is better 
that a politically accountable agency rather than a politically iso-
lated court determine what the statute means.60 At the same time 
(and, indeed, in the same breath), Stevens emphasized the 
agency’s expertise relative to judges, who “are not experts in the 
field.”61 Finally, Stevens (tentatively) advanced the theory that 
ambiguity constitutes an “implicit” delegation from Congress to 
the relevant agency to “fill [the] gap” in the statutory framework.62 
 
 59 Chevron, 467 US at 842–43 (citations omitted). 
 60 See id at 865–66: 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive 
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to 
make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress 
itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by 
the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday 
realities. 
 61 Id at 865. 
 62 Id at 843–44. To be sure, Stevens did not claim that Congress intentionally dele-
gated such gap-filling authority to agencies. Rather, he stated that whether Congress did 
so intentionally or not, the Court would still infer such a delegation, presumably so that 
the question would be resolved by accountable and expert agencies rather than unelected 
and generalist judges. See id at 865: 
Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance 
at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsi-
bility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so; per-
haps it simply did not consider the question at this level; and perhaps Congress 
was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each 
side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For 
judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred. 
Many thus have dubbed this “implied delegation” a legal fiction. See, for example, 
John F. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 Harv L Rev 457, 458 (2014). 
Today, however, there is more reason to think that Congress legislates against the back-
drop of Chevron, see Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 
from the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Can-
ons: Part I, 65 Stan L Rev 901, 995–97 (2013), though there is also evidence suggesting 
that some members of Congress do not want courts to apply Chevron, see Separation of 
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The upshot of the Chevron Court’s analysis is a “counter-Marbury” 
rule of interpretation: rather than saying “what the law is,”63 
courts confronted with ambiguous language should defer to the 
“technical expertise and political accountability” of the agency 
charged with administering the statute.64 
While Stevens framed the Chevron inquiry in two-step terms, 
several scholars have argued that there is a preliminary step im-
plicit in the Chevron analysis, at which the court decides whether 
to apply the Chevron framework at all. Professors Merrill and 
Hickman have called this “Chevron’s ‘step zero.’”65 Although Step 
Zero is complicated (indeed, it may have substeps of its own, 
hence the suggestion that Chevron has four steps66), the gist of 
this idea is that if Chevron is based (even in part) on a theory of 
implied delegation, then it is reasonable to think that there are 
some categories of interpretations for which Congress would not 
want the agency calling the shots. For example, a court may de-
cline to defer at Step Zero because, as in United States v Mead 
Corp,67 the procedures used by the agency were so lacking in for-
mality that it is improbable to think Congress intended the re-
sulting interpretations to receive deference.68 Or a court may deny 
deference at Step Zero because, as in Food and Drug Administra-
tion v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp,69 the policy is so im-
portant that it is unlikely that Congress wanted it resolved by an 
agency.70 The latter version of Step Zero recently received a boost 
from Chief Justice Roberts in King v Burwell,71 the 2015 case 
about whether Affordable Care Act72 tax credits should be avail-
able to individuals who enroll in insurance plans through federal 
 
Powers Restoration Act of 2016, HR 4768, 114th Cong, 2d Sess (July 13, 2016) (calling for 
de novo review of agency actions). For our purposes, it matters not whether Chevron re-
flects congressional intent. In either event, Chevron is still a decision of the Supreme Court 
entitled to stare decisis weight. 
 63 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law 
Is, 115 Yale L J 2580, 2584 (2006), quoting Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 
177 (1803). 
 64 Sunstein, 115 Yale L J at 2583 (cited in note 63). 
 65 See Merrill and Hickman, 89 Georgetown L J at 836 (cited in note 3). 
 66 See, for example, Jordan, 54 Admin L Rev at 725 (cited in note 4). 
 67 533 US 218 (2001). 
 68 Id at 231. 
 69 529 US 120 (2000). 
 70 Id at 159–60. 
 71 135 S Ct 2480 (2015). 
 72 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010). 
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rather than state-run exchanges.73 Writing for a six-justice ma-
jority, the chief justice declined to defer to the Internal Revenue 
Service’s interpretation of the statute, reasoning that the matter 
was of such “deep ‘economic and political significance’” and so 
“central to this statutory scheme” that “had Congress wished to 
assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so 
expressly.”74 
One can see how Chevron Step Zero might be derived from 
the Court’s decision in Chevron. It is not immediately obvious, 
though, that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half follows from Chevron 
itself. Stevens’s opinion in Chevron never suggests that deference 
depends on whether an agency recognizes ambiguity in the stat-
ute.75 Chevron simply says that when Congress has delegated in-
terpretive authority to an agency, “a court may not substitute its 
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable inter-
pretation made by the administrator of an agency.”76 Nowhere 
does the Court even hint that the administrator of an agency must 
recognize that her “reasonable” interpretation is not the only per-
missible interpretation. While we argue below that Step One-
and-a-Half is consistent with the core purposes of Chevron, it 
would be difficult to argue that Step One-and-a-Half is prescribed 
by Chevron. 
But even if Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cannot be derived 
directly from Chevron, new insights about Chevron can indeed be 
derived from Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. First, consider the 
claim by Professors Stephenson and Vermeule—noted above—that 
Chevron has only one step.77 Stephenson and Vermeule assert 
 
 73 King, 135 S Ct at 2485. 
 74 Id at 2489, quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v Environmental Protection 
Agency, 134 S Ct 2427, 2444 (2014), quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 US at 160. 
 75 Indeed, one might question whether the agency in Chevron fully acknowledged its 
own discretion under the Clean Air Act. See Environmental Protection Agency, Require-
ments for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans and Approval 
and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed Reg 50766, 50767 (1981), amending 
40 CFR Parts 51–52: 
Congress expressly provided that states are to play the primary role in pollution 
control. It also intended that states retain the maximum possible flexibility to 
balance environmental and economic concerns in designing plans to clean up 
nonattainment areas. Today’s action follows this mandate by allowing states 
much greater flexibility in developing their nonattainment area NSR programs 
and attainment demonstrations. 
(citations omitted). 
 76 Chevron, 467 US at 844. 
 77 See generally Stephenson and Vermeule, 95 Va L Rev 597 (cited in note 5). 
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that the “single question” in every Chevron case is “whether the 
agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of statutory in-
terpretation.”78 For at least a fleeting moment, the Supreme Court 
seemed in accord with Stephenson and Vermeule’s one-step for-
mulation.79 More recent Supreme Court opinions, however, de-
scribe Chevron in two-step terms.80 What Chevron Step One-and-
a-Half teaches us is that, at least in any court that applies the 
doctrine, the difference between Step One and Step Two very 
much matters. A court may believe that an agency’s interpreta-
tion of a statute is permissible and yet still flunk the agency on 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half grounds because the agency failed 
to describe its interpretation in Step Two terms. In this respect, 
Chevron does indeed have (at least) two steps—and any agency 
that disagrees will have its hat handed to it in the DC Circuit. 
Not only does the existence of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
demonstrate that Stephenson and Vermeule’s consolidation of the 
Chevron inquiry fails to fit with DC Circuit doctrine, but it also 
offers direction for the order in which the inquiry should occur. 
Professor Richard Re has argued that courts should have the op-
tion of proceeding with the Chevron inquiry in reverse: 
“[O]ptional two-step Chevron would first ask the reasonableness 
question, and then it would give courts discretion to ask a second 
question regarding mandatoriness.”81 Re further argued that the 
 
 78 Id at 599. 
 79 See Entergy Corp v Riverkeeper, Inc, 556 US 208, 218 n 4 (2009) (“[S]urely if 
Congress has directly spoken to an issue then any agency interpretation contradicting 
what Congress has said would be unreasonable.”). 
 80 See Encino Motorcars, LLC v Navarro, 136 S Ct 2117, 2124 (2016): 
In the usual course, when an agency is authorized by Congress to issue regulations 
and promulgates a regulation interpreting a statute it enforces, the interpretation 
receives deference if the statute is ambiguous and if the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable. This principle is implemented by the two-step analysis set forth in 
Chevron. 
See also King, 135 S Ct at 2488–89 (“When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a stat-
ute, we often apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron. . . . In extraordinary 
cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has in-
tended such an implicit delegation. This is one of those cases.”) (quotation marks, citation, 
and paragraph break omitted). Note, though, that in both of these cases, the Court ulti-
mately declined to apply the Chevron framework, resolving the matter at what might be 
described as Chevron Step Zero, see Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Con-
sequences of King v. Burwell, 2015 Pepperdine L Rev 56, 57, or Chevron Step 0.5, see 
Daniel Hemel and Michael Pollack, Chevron Step 0.5 (Whatever Source Derived, June 
23, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/M4M2-WM7P (discussing Encino Motorcars). 
 81 Re, 89 Ind L J at 619 (cited in note 5). 
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optional two-step formulation of Chevron is consistent with cur-
rent practice in the federal courts of appeals.82 Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half suggests that, at least in the DC Circuit, courts do not 
have the option of resolving Chevron cases on Step Two grounds 
alone—at least not in cases in which the court ultimately upholds 
the agency’s interpretation. If a petitioner or plaintiff seeking re-
view of an agency rule brings a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
challenge in the DC Circuit or DC federal district court, the ap-
pellate panel or district judge does not have the option of holding 
that the agency’s interpretation is reasonable and calling it a day. 
To respond to the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half challenge, the 
panel would have to determine whether the agency acknowledged 
ambiguity in the statute; if not, then the panel or district judge 
would have to determine whether the agency’s characterization of 
the statute as unambiguous is correct. To be sure, an agency that 
jumps straight to Step Two without expressing any opinion on the 
statute’s ambiguity (or lack thereof) might survive Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half (more on this in Part V.A). But a court that jumps 
straight to Step Two in a case in which a Step One-and-a-Half 
challenge has been raised would be acting inconsistently with DC 
Circuit doctrine. 
B. Chenery I 
Four decades Chevron’s senior, the Chenery I rule is another 
“hoary principle of administrative law.”83 And like Chevron, the 
Chenery I rule is easy to state but not always to apply: when a 
court reviews an agency decision, “[t]he grounds upon which an 
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the 
record discloses that its action was based.”84 In other words, if the 
agency proffers a bad reason for its decision, a court will not up-
hold the decision just because the agency could have offered a 
good reason. In fact, this rule applies even if the agency’s own 
lawyers later offer that very good reason to the court during judi-
cial review.85 Instead, so long as the agency has any discretion in 
 
 82 Id at 641. 
 83 National Association of Home Builders v Defenders of Wildlife, 551 US 644, 684 
(2007) (Stevens dissenting). See also generally Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foun-
dations of Chenery, 116 Yale L J 952 (2007) (emphasizing the constitutional significance 
of the doctrine). 
 84 Chenery I, 318 US at 87. 
 85 See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 Harv L Rev 505, 
526 n 106 (1985), quoting American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc v Donovan, 452 
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the matter (for there is no reason to remand otherwise86), what 
counts is what the agency said at the time of its decision. 
The facts of Chenery I provide a good example of how this 
works. In Chenery I, a company proposed a reorganization. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission agreed to allow the reor-
ganization, “but also ordered that ‘preferred stock’ acquired by 
certain ‘officers, directors, and controlling stockholders’ while re-
organization plans were before the Commission could not ‘partic-
ipate in the reorganization on an equal footing with all other pre-
ferred stock.’”87 The SEC justified its decision by invoking 
common-law principles as articulated by courts. The Supreme 
Court concluded, however, that the common-law principles relied 
on by the SEC were inapplicable to this situation—the agency 
misunderstood the common law.88 Instead of deciding whether the 
agency’s decision could be sustained on other grounds, the Court 
remanded to the agency.89 (Much like in the polar bear litigation, 
the agency responded on remand with new justifications for its 
old position, and the Supreme Court upheld the agency’s decision 
the second time around.)90 
The Chenery I principle is often invoked in modern adminis-
trative law (though not quite as often invoked as Chevron).91 It 
played a prominent role in Michigan v Environmental Protection 
Agency,92 a 2015 decision in which the Supreme Court rejected 
EPA’s claim that it could regulate mercury emissions from coal 
power plants.93 The DC Circuit likewise invokes Chenery I on a 
 
US 490, 539 (1981) (“A corollary of this rule is that ‘the post hoc rationalizations’ of the 
agency or its counsel ‘cannot serve as a sufficient predicate for agency action.’”). 
 86 See, for example, Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc v Public Utility District No 1 
of Snohomish County, 554 US 527, 544–45 (2008): 
We will not uphold a discretionary agency decision where the agency has offered 
a justification in court different from what it provided in its opinion. But FERC 
has lucked out: The Chenery doctrine has no application to these cases, because 
we conclude that the Commission was required [to act as it did]. 
(citation omitted). 
 87 Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 Georgetown L J 943, 958 (2017), 
quoting Chenery I, 318 US at 81. 
 88 See Chenery I, 318 US at 89–90. 
 89 Id at 95. 
 90 See Securities & Exchange Commission v Chenery Corp, 332 US 194, 199, 209 
(1947) (“Chenery II”). See also Nielson, 105 Georgetown L J at 959–60 (cited in note 87). 
 91 Walker, Most Cited Supreme Court Administrative Law Decisions (cited in note 57). 
 92 135 S Ct 2699 (2015). 
 93 See id at 2710 (“This line of reasoning contradicts the foundational principle of 
administrative law that a court may uphold agency action only on the grounds that the 
agency invoked when it took the action.”). See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc 
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regular basis when an agency puts forth a new rationale for an 
action in litigation that the agency did not cite in the first in-
stance.94 To be sure, as noted above, Chenery I does not require a 
remand when the agency’s decision is the only one the law allows, 
and sometimes (though rarely) an agency may offer a post hoc 
justification.95 But as a general rule, Chenery I requires an 
agency’s decision to clear two hurdles: it must be lawful and the 
reason why it is lawful must be the one given by the agency itself 
at the time it announced the decision. Otherwise, the decision 
cannot stand, even if the same outcome could be permissible. 
On one view, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is simply an ap-
plication of Chenery I.96 If an agency initially says that it is adopt-
ing a particular position because it believes that the statute so 
requires, a court cannot uphold the agency’s action on the ground 
that the statute is ambiguous but the agency’s interpretation is 
permissible. The agency, after all, gave the “wrong” reason for its 
decision. 
Yet the path from Chenery I to Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
may not be quite that straightforward, depending on how broadly 
one reads Chenery I. Consider again the polar bear example. Imag-
ine two potential arguments that the Fish and Wildlife Service 
could make in the preamble to its listing rule: 
(a) Congress clearly intended for the term “endangered” to in-
clude an imminence requirement. The legislative history says 
that Congress sought to establish “two levels of protection”—
“endangered” and “threatened”—with the two levels distin-
guished by whether the danger of extinction is “imminent.”97 
(b) The text of the ESA is ambiguous as to whether “endan-
gered” includes an imminence requirement. Nonetheless, we 
 
v Volpe, 401 US 402, 420 (1971) (stating that “post hoc rationalization[s] . . . must be 
viewed critically”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 94 See, for example, National Labor Relations Board v Southwest Regional Council 
of Carpenters, 826 F3d 460, 465 (DC Cir 2016) (“Even if the Board had explained the rele-
vance of these alleged factual differences, we cannot address this argument because it did 
not appear in the Board’s orders below.”). 
 95 See, for example, Camp v Pitts, 411 US 138, 142–43 (1973) (per curiam) (allowing 
post hoc justifications when “there was such failure to explain administrative action as to 
frustrate effective judicial review”). But see Florida Power & Light Co v Lorion, 470 US 
729, 744 (1985) (concluding that, even in such circumstances, remanding the case is often 
preferable). 
 96 This was certainly the view of the majority in Prill itself. See Prill, 755 F2d at 948 
(“We think that the teachings of Chenery are plainly implicated in this case.”). 
 97 Endangered Species Act of 1973, S Rep No 93-307, 93d Cong, 1st Sess 3 (1973). 
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believe that such a requirement best carries out congres-
sional intent. The legislative history says that Congress 
sought to establish “two levels of protection”—“endangered” 
and “threatened”—with the two levels distinguished by 
whether the danger of extinction is “imminent.”98 
Assume, for present purposes, that the court considers legis-
lative history to be a relevant consideration, at least at Chevron 
Step Two.99 Would there really be a Chenery I problem with up-
holding the agency’s listing decision, whether the agency’s prof-
fered rationale is (a) or (b)? In both scenarios, the agency has cited 
the legislative history as a reason for its decision, and so 
Chenery I (arguably100) allows the court to rely on that reason on 
review. And yet in scenario (a), the agency might well run into a 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half problem. Unlike in scenario (b), the 
agency in scenario (a) does not acknowledge ambiguity. Quite the 
contrary, the agency maintains that congressional intent is clear. 
To be sure, the agency relies on legislative history rather than stat-
utory text, but the DC Circuit has said under similar circumstances 
that if an agency does not acknowledge ambiguity, then it is un-
deserving of Chevron deference.101 
To put the point in slightly different terms, imagine an 
agency says, “The statute unambiguously means X for reasons A, 
B, and C.” Chenery I clearly prevents the agency from pivoting in 
litigation and arguing that the statute should be interpreted to 
mean X for reasons D, E, and F. It is not so obvious, though, that 
Chenery I stands in the way of a court saying: “We believe that 
the statute is ambiguous, but reasons A, B, and C are all perfectly 
 
 98 Id. 
 99 See, for example, Fournier v Sebelius, 718 F3d 1110, 1123 (9th Cir 2013) (holding 
that, at Chevron Step Two, “legislative history permissibly may be considered”). 
 100 Of course, one could read Chenery I in a more maximalist fashion, such that sce-
nario (a) would not be upheld because the agency did not acknowledge its discretion, just 
as if the agency had not acknowledged its discretion for reasons that do not sound in stat-
utory interpretation. Even though the agency said its reading was consistent with the 
legislative history, by definition it could have reached another result despite the legislative 
history. Otherwise, this could not be a Chevron Step Two case. It is enough here to observe 
that it is not obvious that Chenery I should be read in such a maximalist fashion, though 
for what it is worth, one of the authors (Nielson) subscribes to a maximalist view, while 
the other (Hemel) is not yet persuaded. Perhaps tellingly, courts also appear to vary 
widely on how they understand Chenery I. See Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 306–07 (cited 
in note 12). 
 101 See PDK Laboratories Inc v United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362 
F3d 786, 794 (DC Cir 2004) (refusing to grant Chevron deference when an agency official 
“cited ‘the legislative history’” of the statute in question “[a]s one of his reasons for think-
ing the statute clear”). 
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good reasons for interpreting the statute to mean X, and so we 
affirm the agency.” That latter disposition may or may not be con-
sistent with Chenery I, depending on how broadly one reads 
Chenery I. But no matter how one reads Chenery I, the latter justi-
fication would definitely run afoul of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. 
C. State Farm 
If Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is not implicit in Chevron 
and is not (necessarily) required by Chenery I, might it be derived 
from the State Farm doctrine? State Farm holds that an agency 
must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action”—it 
must show, in other words, that its action was “the product of rea-
soned decisionmaking.”102 Perhaps we can say that an agency 
flunks the “satisfactory explanation” requirement—and there-
fore regulates unreasonably—when it says that the statute is un-
ambiguous even though the statute is susceptible to multiple 
meanings. 
Maybe—but we are doubtful. The fact that an agency thinks 
Congress’s intent is clear while the court thinks the statute is am-
biguous does not mean that the agency’s view is unreasonable. As 
we allude to above, some courts consider legislative history at 
Chevron Step One: on this view, legislative history can render a 
statute unambiguous under certain circumstances.103 Others con-
sider legislative history only at Step Two.104 An agency and a court 
might disagree as to whether to resolve a statutory interpretation 
question at Step One or Step Two, but that does not mean that 
either holds an unreasonable view, much less that the agency has 
employed a faulty process or ignored key parts of the problem. 
More generally, one can conceptualize statutory clarity as a 
spectrum (say, from zero to one, with zero being totally ambigu-
ous and one being completely clear).105 The statute specifying that 
presidential elections must be held “on the Tuesday next after the 
 
 102 State Farm, 463 US at 43, 52. 
 103 See, for example, National Electrical Manufacturers Association v United States 
Department of Energy, 654 F3d 496, 504–05 (4th Cir 2011) (“[W]e have described legisla-
tive history as one of the traditional tools of interpretation to be consulted at Chevron’s 
step one.”). 
 104 See, for example, Village of Barrington, Illinois v Surface Transportation Board, 
636 F3d 650, 666 (DC Cir 2011) (“Although we would be uncomfortable relying on such 
legislative history at Chevron step one, we think it may appropriately guide an agency in 
interpreting an ambiguous statute.”). 
 105 For a similar take, see Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2137–38 (cited 
in note 8). 
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first Monday in November”106 might qualify as a 0.99 on the scale, 
while the Federal Communications Commission’s power over as-
signment of station licenses (such assignments are allowed if the 
Commission determines “the public interest, convenience, and ne-
cessity will be served”107) might land at 0.01. We might further 
imagine that any statutory provision 0.5 or higher is “unambigu-
ous” for Chevron purposes (that is, the case will be resolved at 
Step One), and any statutory provision below 0.5 on the clarity 
scale is “ambiguous” (that is, the case can proceed to Step Two). 
We might also imagine that intelligent interpreters acting in good 
faith will sometimes differ in their assessments, at least over a 
limited range. For instance, one might rate a provision a 0.3 on 
the clarity scale while another equally intelligent, equally well-
intentioned interpreter might rate the same provision a 0.2 or a 
0.4 (though probably not a 0.9). 
From this perspective, an agency’s statement that a statutory 
provision is unambiguous may sometimes show that the agency’s 
decision is not the “product of reasoned decisionmaking,”108 but 
not always. It might be unreasonable for the FCC to say its license 
assignment power is unambiguous. But an agency might reason-
ably conclude that a statutory provision is a 0.51 while the court 
sees it as a 0.49. In the latter scenario, the agency would have a 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half problem (assuming it does not in-
sert the requisite disclaimer), but there would be no obvious State 
Farm issue. To be sure, we are not saying that 0.5 is the right 
threshold, nor that such fine distinctions are necessarily possible. 
The important point is that an agency’s decision can be the prod-
uct of “reasoned decisionmaking,” the hallmark of State Farm, yet 
still fail Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half. 
Granted, there are affinities between Chevron Step-One-and-
a-Half and State Farm: both doctrines look to the content of an 
agency’s explanation for adopting a particular position. But not 
every case in which the agency runs into a Chevron Step-One-
and-a-Half problem is also a case in which the agency would flunk 
State Farm review (and, of course, vice versa). 
 
 106 3 USC § 1. Or so we would think. Perhaps one might argue that “the Tuesday next” 
means “next Tuesday” as opposed to “this Tuesday,” so if the first Monday in November is 
November 7, then “the Tuesday next” is November 15. 
 107 47 USC § 310(d). 
 108 State Farm, 463 US at 52. 
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D. Prill 
Despite not being compelled by Chevron, Chenery I, or State 
Farm, Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half is a firmly entrenched prin-
ciple of DC Circuit law. Its origin is traceable at least as far back 
as the DC Circuit’s 1985 decision in Prill, which announced the 
following rule: 
[A]n agency regulation must be declared invalid, even though 
the agency might be able to adopt the regulation in the exer-
cise of its discretion, if it was not based on the agency’s own 
judgment but rather on the unjustified assumption that it 
was Congress’ judgment that such a regulation is desirable.109 
In operation, this means the court will “strike[ ] down an 
agency interpretation, not because the interpretation was incon-
sistent with the statute, but because the agency wrongly assumed 
that a particular interpretation was commanded by the stat-
ute.”110 Thus, “[d]eference to an agency’s statutory interpretation 
‘is only appropriate when the agency has exercised its own judg-
ment,’ not when it believes that interpretation is compelled by 
Congress.”111 
The troubling facts of Prill illustrate the doctrine. A truck 
driver named Kenneth Prill was fired for complaining “about the 
unsafe condition of a company truck and trailer.”112 Even though 
the truck was unsafe (indeed, state officials agreed with him), 
Prill was let go “because company officials decided that they could 
not have him ‘calling the cops all the time.’”113 Upset, Prill sought 
relief from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging 
that his firing was an unfair labor practice.114 Relevant here, an 
 
 109 Prill, 755 F2d at 948 (quotation marks and brackets omitted), quoting Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc v Heckler, 712 F2d 650, 666 (DC Cir 1983) (Bork 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 110 Stuart Buck, Salerno vs. Chevron: What to Do about Statutory Challenges, 55 
Admin L Rev 427, 472 (2003). See also Charles H. Koch Jr, Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Discretion, 54 Geo Wash L Rev 469, 482 n 54 (1986): 
[T]he court found that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) failed to rec-
ognize that the broad standard conferred executing discretion and that the 
NLRB acted improperly by not exercising it. . . . [T]he court was perfectly correct 
in instructing the agency of the boundaries of that discretion and compelling it 
to exercise that discretion according to the breadth of the legislative standard. 
 111 Arizona v Thompson, 281 F3d 248, 254 (DC Cir 2002), quoting Phillips Petroleum 
Co v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 792 F2d 1165, 1169 (DC Cir 1986). 
 112 Prill, 755 F2d at 942. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
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administrative law judge agreed that Prill’s safety complaint was 
protected under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act115 (NLRA) 
as a “concerted activit[y],”116 but the NLRB disagreed because, on 
its view of the NLRA, “an employee’s conduct is not ‘concerted’ un-
less it is ‘engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, 
and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.’”117 
This issue then came to the DC Circuit, which concluded that 
the NLRB was wrong to say that it lacked discretion to consider 
Prill’s activity “concerted.” The agency, however, urged that its 
decision rejecting Prill’s position should nonetheless be upheld be-
cause the NLRB has “broad authority to construe the NLRA.”118 
The DC Circuit would have none of it, explaining that “judicial 
deference is not accorded a decision of the NLRB when the Board 
acts pursuant to an erroneous view of law and, as a consequence, 
fails to exercise the discretion delegated to it by Congress.”119 Be-
cause the NLRB was wrong to conclude that its interpretation of 
the statute was “mandated” by the statute,120 the court remanded 
“under the principles of [Chenery I], so that the Board may recon-
sider the scope of ‘concerted activities’ under section 7.”121 Because 
the agency’s mistake might have had some “bearing on the proce-
dure used or the substance of decision reached,” the NLRB’s deci-
sion could not stand.122 
Prill, which was argued and decided just months after Chevron, 
never cites Stevens’s now-canonical opinion; in subsequent cases, 
however, the DC Circuit has made the link between Chevron and 
Prill clearer. An illustrative example is Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc 
v Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. Peter Pan con-
cerned two competing budget bus lines: Peter Pan Bus Lines and 
 
 115 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified as amended at 29 USC § 151 et seq. 
 116 See 29 USC § 157 (“Employees shall have the right . . . to engage in [ ] concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”). 
 117 Prill, 755 F2d at 942. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id at 948 (concluding, inter alia, “that the Board erred in assuming that the NLRA 
mandates its present interpretation of ‘concerted activities’”). 
 121 Prill, 755 F2d at 942 (citation omitted). 
 122 Id at 948. See also Phillips Petroleum, 792 F2d at 1169 (“This deference, however, 
is only appropriate when the agency has exercised its own judgment. When, instead, the 
agency’s decision is based on an erroneous view of the law, its decision cannot stand.”). On 
remand, the NLRB adhered to its position that Prill’s activity was not “concerted”: it 
acknowledged that its interpretation of the NLRA “is not actually required by the NLRA 
but rather is most responsive to the central purposes for which the Act was created.” Prill 
v National Labor Relations Board, 835 F2d 1481, 1483 (DC Cir 1987) (quotation marks 
omitted). The DC Circuit affirmed the NLRB’s ruling the second time around. Id at 1482. 
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Fung Wah Transportation, Inc (known to a generation of East 
Coast college students as “the Chinatown bus”). Fung Wah filed an 
application with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA) for a license to operate a passenger bus line between 
New York and Boston.123 Peter Pan objected to Fung Wah’s appli-
cation because, Peter Pan said, “Fung Wah was unwilling or un-
able to comply with the requirements of the regulations [the De-
partment of Transportation] has promulgated under the 
Americans With Disabilities Act.”124 The agency, however, con-
cluded that the licensing statute did not allow it to consider Fung 
Wah’s alleged Americans with Disabilities Act125 (ADA) violations 
as part of the licensing proceeding.126 
As in Prill, the DC Circuit disagreed with the agency’s view 
of the statute.127 In the court’s view, the licensing statute did not 
unambiguously preclude the FMCSA from considering the ADA 
violations as part of the licensing proceeding. As Judge Karen 
LeCraft Henderson wrote for the panel: 
Under the Chevron two-step, we stop the music at step one if 
the Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue. . . . But if the statute is silent or ambiguous, we dance 
on and, at step two, defer to the Commission’s interpretation 
if it is based on a permissible construction of the statute. . . . 
In rejecting Peter Pan’s argument that [the licensing statute 
allowed for consideration of alleged ADA violations], the 
FMCSA unequivocally declared: “This interpretation is not 
consistent with the plain language of the statute and the leg-
islative history.” . . . To the contrary, we find the text of the 
statute to be ambiguous. . . . We therefore cannot uphold the 
FMCSA’s interpretation under step 1 of Chevron. Nor may 
we review it under step 2. . . . We must therefore remand for 
the FMCSA to interpret the statutory language anew.128 
Peter Pan may be the clearest statement of how the Chevron 
Step-One-and-a-Half doctrine fits into the broader Chevron 
framework. In terms of its outcome, however, Peter Pan is not an 
outlier. To the contrary, the DC Circuit regularly invokes Prill 
 
 123 Peter Pan, 471 F3d at 1352. 
 124 Id at 1351–52. 
 125 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990), codified as amended at 42 USC § 12101 
et seq. 
 126 See Peter Pan, 471 F3d at 1352–53. 
 127 See id at 1353–55. 
 128 Id at 1353–54 (brackets, paragraph breaks, and quotation marks omitted). 
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and its progeny in Chevron cases—or at least relatively regularly. 
As Professor Bagley has noted, “[e]xamples abound” of the DC 
Circuit applying (and, in Bagley’s view, misapplying) the Prill 
framework.129 
Other courts have also recognized Chevron Step-One-and-a-
Half—including arguably the US Supreme Court. In Negusie v 
Holder, the justices confronted the “persecutor bar” in immigra-
tion law, which precludes anyone from receiving refugee status 
who has “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in 
the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion.”130 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), following what 
it believed judicial precedent to require, concluded “that the per-
secutor bar applies even if the alien’s assistance in persecution 
was coerced or otherwise the product of duress.”131 Although 
agreeing that the BIA would be eligible for Chevron deference on 
this question in the ordinary course, the Supreme Court did not 
defer to the agency’s interpretation because, contrary to the 
agency’s claim, the question was not foreclosed by judicial prece-
dent.132 Before the Supreme Court, lawyers for the BIA argued 
that even if the agency’s interpretation was not mandated, it was 
at least “reasonable and thus controlling.”133 Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, however, writing for the Court, rejected the applicabil-
ity of Chevron, using language reminiscent of Chevron Step-One-
and-a-Half: “The BIA deemed its interpretation to be mandated[,] 
. . . and that error prevented it from a full consideration of the 
statutory question here presented.”134 With a favorable citation to 
the DC Circuit, the Court remanded to “[t]he agency [to] confront 
the same question free of this mistaken legal premise.”135 
Negusie goes a fair bit of the way toward establishing Chevron 
Step-One-and-a-Half as the law of the (entire) land. But it does 
 
 129 Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 300 & n 326 (cited in note 12) (providing examples). 
See also note 29 (providing more examples). 
 130 8 USC § 1101(a)(42). 
 131 Negusie, 555 US at 514. 
 132 See id at 517–18. 
 133 Id at 521, quoting Brief for the Respondent, Negusie v Mukasey, Docket No 07-499, 
*11 (US filed Aug 15, 2008) (available on Westlaw at 2008 WL 3851621). 
 134 Negusie, 555 US at 521. 
 135 Id at 516. See also id at 523, quoting Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, Inc v 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 924 F2d 1132, 1136 (DC Cir 1991) (“If an agency 
erroneously contends that Congress’ intent has been clearly expressed and has rested on 
that ground, we remand to require the agency to consider the question afresh in light of 
the ambiguity we see.”) (brackets omitted). 
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not go all of the way. For one thing, the context of Negusie was 
peculiar. The agency did not engage in statutory interpretation as 
much as it engaged in judicial-decision interpretation. That may 
present a different type of analysis (whether it should is a question 
for another day). Likewise, Negusie’s analysis is quite cursory. If 
the Court was, in fact, adopting Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half, it 
did not really explain why it was making such an important doc-
trinal move, much less did it explain the scope of the doctrine. 
Given this cursory analysis, it is hardly surprising that lower 
courts do not appear to have taken the justices’ hint, if in fact the 
justices were giving such a hint.136 
Indeed, Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half has not been adopted 
everywhere—even after Negusie. For instance, it appears that 
neither the Second nor the Third Circuit has “yet addressed the 
question of whether [Chevron] deference is only appropriate when 
the agency has exercised its own judgment, not when it believes 
that its interpretation is compelled by Congress.”137 Before Negusie, 
the Sixth Circuit deferred to the Department of Agriculture at 
Chevron Step Two even while holding that the Department had 
 
 136 The Supreme Court arguably indicated its endorsement of the Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half doctrine long before Negusie, in Federal Communications Commission v RCA 
Communications, Inc, 346 US 86 (1953). The relevant statute directed the Federal 
Communications Commission to grant radio licenses whenever it “shall determine that 
public interest, convenience, or necessity would be served by the granting thereof.” Radio 
Act of 1927 § 11, 44 Stat 1162, 1167. The Commission took the position that “competition 
is in the public interest where competition is reasonably feasible.” RCA Communications, 
346 US at 89 (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court ordered a lower court to remand 
the matter to the Commission. As Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote for the Court, “[T]he 
Commission professed to dispose of the case merely upon its view of a principle which it 
derived from the statute and did not base its conclusion on matters within its own special 
competence.” Id at 91. Because the Court did not think that the statute unambiguously 
stood for the principle that the Commission had derived, the Court ordered the Commission 
to reconsider its licensing decision, bringing its “own experience” to bear. Id at 91, 98. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in RCA Communications has all the essential features 
of a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remand: the agency professed that the statute was un-
ambiguous; the Court concluded that the agency in fact enjoyed discretion; and so the 
Court remanded the matter to the agency for a do-over. Yet RCA Communications pre-
ceded Chevron by more than three decades. To call it the genesis of the Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half doctrine might be placing the cart before the horse. At the very least, though, 
RCA Communications suggests that the rule articulated in Prill has antecedents that ex-
tend much further back than Prill—indeed, much further back than Chevron itself. 
 137 Martinez v Attorney General of United States, 693 F3d 408, 412 (3d Cir 2012) (quo-
tation marks and brackets omitted). See also Murray v UBS Securities, LLC, 2013 WL 
2190084, *6 (SDNY) (“The Second Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether 
deference is only appropriate when the agency has exercised its own judgment, not when 
it believes that its interpretation is compelled by Congress.”) (quotation marks and 
brackets omitted). 
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incorrectly concluded that its interpretation was compelled by 
Congress.138 The Seventh Circuit seemed to take a different ap-
proach before Negusie: after holding that the BIA had incorrectly 
concluded it lacked discretion, the Seventh Circuit did not re-
mand the case to the BIA but instead decided the issue itself de 
novo.139 Post-Negusie, the Seventh Circuit has not decided 
whether this remains good law. The Ninth Circuit appeared to 
adopt the doctrine in a 2013 case, but has not applied it since.140 
And the Tenth and Federal Circuits have cited DC Circuit case 
law to the effect that an agency is ineligible for deference at 
Chevron Step Two if it believes that the statute is clear, though 
those courts have yet to remand a case on Step One-and-a-Half 
grounds.141 
III.  THE PUZZLE OF CHEVRON STEP ONE-AND-A-HALF 
In the previous Part, we discussed the murky doctrinal origins 
of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. An even more perplexing puzzle 
is why these cases continue to crop up. The first few Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half cases are easy enough to account for: in Prill and 
other early cases, the agency might not have known what was 
coming. But it is not 1985 anymore. Over time, we should expect 
 
 138 See Lansing Dairy, Inc v Espy, 39 F3d 1339, 1354–55 (6th Cir 1994) (“Because, as 
discussed above, the language of the Act and the legislative history are not unambiguous 
and the Secretary’s interpretation is neither unreasonable nor in conflict with Congress’ 
intent, we are bound by Chevron to uphold the Secretary’s interpretation.”). 
 139 See Escobar Barraza v Mukasey, 519 F3d 388, 391 (7th Cir 2008): 
[W]e do not give any special weight to the agency’s construction. . . . That’s not 
because we think the statute unambiguous. . . . But the Board (acting by a single 
member) asserted that the statute is clear, and by forswearing any exercise of 
administrative discretion the Board also disabled its counsel from invoking the 
principle of Chevron. 
But see Madison Gas & Electric Co v United States Environmental Protection Agency, 25 
F3d 526, 529 (7th Cir 1994): 
The EPA knows more about it than we do and under Chevron has the primary 
responsibility for interpreting undefined terms. But it has not furnished a rea-
soned ground for denying these utilities’ requests for additional allowances and 
it therefore must, if it wants to adhere to its denial, try again. 
 140 Gila River Indian Community v United States, 729 F3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir 2013) 
(“We conclude that the Secretary’s interpretation warrants no deference because it rests 
on a mistaken conclusion that the language has a plain meaning.”). 
 141 See American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1592 v Federal Labor 
Relations Authority, 836 F3d 1291, 1295–96 (10th Cir 2016), citing PDK Laboratories, 362 
F3d at 798, and Peter Pan, 471 F3d at 1354; National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, 
Inc v Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 314 F3d 1373, 1378–79 (Fed Cir 2003), citing Transi-
tional Hospitals Corp of Louisiana, Inc v Shalala, 222 F3d 1019, 1029 (DC Cir 2000). 
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agencies to become accustomed to Step One-and-a-Half and to 
write their rules and orders to avoid being tripped up by the doc-
trine. After all, sometimes it may not take much effort to insulate 
a decision from any Chevron Step One-a-and-Half problem—a 
disclaimer combined with some analysis of why the agency’s in-
terpretation is good policy may be enough.142 
And yet far from falling into desuetude, Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half remains a vital doctrine—at least in the DC Circuit 
and the DC federal district court (with rarer appearances be-
yond143). What might account for the continued appearance of 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases more than thirty years after 
Prill? Why haven’t agencies adapted by writing their rules with 
an eye toward sidestepping any potential Chevron Step One-and-
a-Half issues?144 
To be sure, some have. Sometimes an agency will argue that 
its reading is compelled by the statute while adding—in the alter-
native—that it would reach the same conclusion as a matter of 
discretion.145 Yet this practice, while apparently not uncommon, 
is not universal. And while the costs of drafting such a disclaimer 
are nonzero (especially because an agency may still run into a 
State Farm problem if it fails to justify its policy choice), an 
agency can circumvent Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as long as it 
clearly states that it would adopt the same policy even if it had 
another option. 
Setting the drafting costs aside, why else might an agency 
say that its decision is compelled by Congress, without also saying 
 
 142 See, for example, Environmental Protection Agency, Prevention of Significant De-
terioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed Reg 31514, 31528 (2010), 
amending various sections of CFR Title 40 (“We believe that this approach is both com-
pelled by the statute and reflects the preferable policy approach.”); Local Union 1261, 
District 22, United Mine Workers of America v Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 
Commission, 917 F2d 42, 43 (DC Cir 1990) (upholding an agency decision despite disagree-
ment over whether the statute was “clear” because the agency also “adequately stated the 
practical and policy considerations ultimately motivating its interpretation”). 
 143 See text accompanying notes 140–41. 
 144 We refer to “rules” in text but note that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half applies with 
equal force to agency statutory interpretations in adjudicative proceedings. See, for exam-
ple, Alarm Industry Communications Committee v Federal Communications Commission, 
131 F3d 1066, 1072 (DC Cir 1997); City of Los Angeles Department of Airports v United 
States Department of Transportation, 103 F3d 1027, 1034 (DC Cir 1997); Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad Co v Interstate Commerce Commission, 826 F2d 1125, 1129 (DC Cir 1987). 
 145 See note 52. 
04 HEMEL&NIELSON_ART_IC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2017  9:58 PM 
790  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:757 
   
that it would reach the same result as an exercise of discretion? 
We suggest six hypotheses.146 
A. Agency Ignorance 
Perhaps the likeliest answer is that, more than thirty years 
after Prill, many agency lawyers remain unaware of the Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half doctrine. They probably would not have 
learned about it in law school, even if they graduated after the 
doctrine emerged in the mid-1980s. After all, no mention of Prill 
appears in leading administrative law casebooks.147 While survey 
evidence indicates that agency drafters are generally aware of 
Chevron, their knowledge of other administrative law doctrines is 
not nearly as widespread (for example, 39 percent of drafters sur-
veyed said they were unaware of Mead, and 47 percent said they 
were unaware of Bowles v Seminole Rock & Sand Co148 / Auer v 
Robbins149).150 We have no similar data with respect to Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half, but we expect that in at least some cases, 
the agency lawyers drafting rules and orders are simply unaware 
of the doctrine. Ignorance, however, is a less likely explanation 
for agencies that appear regularly before the DC Circuit. 
B. Agency Ambivalence 
Another possibility is that agency leaders—or the lawyers 
who work under them—genuinely believe that the relevant stat-
utory provision is unambiguous but are less than enthusiastic 
about that result as a policy matter. To return to the polar bear 
example, Fish and Wildlife Service officials might believe that the 
term “endangered” implies an imminent risk of extinction, but the 
officials might wish to list the polar bear as an endangered species 
 
 146 Chevron Step One-and-a-Half can be applied to both agency rulemakings and 
agency adjudications—it applies whenever an agency does not recognize that it has inter-
pretative discretion. For purposes of this Article, our analysis does not turn on this dis-
tinction. In the future, however, this may be a fruitful avenue of research. For instance, 
perhaps agencies are more “strategic” in rulemakings than adjudications, or vice versa. 
Such questions, while important, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 147 See generally Stephen G. Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: 
Problems, Text, and Cases (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 7th ed 2011); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, et al, Administrative Law: The American Public Law System; Cases and Materials 
(West Academic 7th ed 2014). 
 148 325 US 410 (1945). 
 149 519 US 452 (1997). 
 150 See Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 Stan L Rev 
999, 1019 (2015). 
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if they could. Alternatively, agency officials might believe that the 
term “endangered” implies imminence but might be uncertain as 
to how they would resolve the issue if freed from statutory shack-
les. In either scenario, agency officials might decide to argue that 
the term “endangered” unambiguously means imminent risk of 
extinction, and if a reviewing court decides otherwise, then they 
will reverse (or at least reconsider) their position if and when they 
have to. 
The first version of the “ambivalence” story—agency officials 
believe the statute unambiguously means X but wish they could 
do Y—strikes us as a strained explanation for the continued ap-
pearance of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases. Let’s say that the 
statutory provision either (i) unambiguously means X or (ii) is 
ambiguous and could mean X or Y. Let’s also say that agency of-
ficials would prefer result Y. If there is a credible argument that 
the statute is ambiguous, then we would expect agency officials 
who desire result Y to make that argument. For this first version 
of the ambivalence story to be true, there would have to be an 
argument as to why the statutory provision is ambiguous that the 
court recognizes but the agency officials do not. This is not impos-
sible—agency officials sometimes overlook viable arguments in 
their favor—but we have trouble believing that this a frequent 
reason for Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remands. In a world in 
which agency officials are able to spot “ambiguities” that courts 
reject as nonexistent or borderline frivolous,151 it is more than a 
bit strange to think that agency officials are unable to spot ambi-
guities that support the agency’s preferred policy and that the re-
viewing court can nonetheless identify. 
Note, moreover, that in the first scenario—agency officials be-
lieve that the statute unambiguously means X but wish it were 
not so—the agency has an option other than simply failing to ar-
gue in the alternative. The agency can say, “We think the statute 
unambiguously means X, but we think that Y is the better policy.” 
Indeed, one can find quite a few examples in the Federal Register 
of agencies taking this tack.152 This is similar to what judges do 
 
 151 See, for example, Alarm Industry Communications Committee, 131 F3d at 1068 
(rejecting an agency interpretation as “senseless”). 
 152 See, for example, Library of Congress, Copyright Office, Copyright Arbitration 
Royalty Panels, 59 Fed Reg 63025, 63032 (1994), amending various sections of CFR Ti-
tle 37 (“The method of payment of the CARPs is a problem, especially given our lack of 
statutory authority to pay the arbitrators directly. Unfortunately, the legislative solution 
discussed in the Interim Regulations . . . failed for this Congress.”); National Credit Union 
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when they criticize a law but state that they nonetheless must 
apply it.153 Agencies, to be sure, sometimes may be reluctant to 
play the blame game for fear of irritating Congress. But if the 
agency feels strongly that it is being forced to act against the pub-
lic interest, it can say so. It is perhaps telling that we can find no 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half case in which an agency says that 
it is acting contrary to its view of the public interest because it 
believes Congress has mandated that result and a reviewing court 
then concludes that the statute is in fact ambiguous. 
The second version of the “ambivalence” story—agency offi-
cials believe that the statute unambiguously means X but have 
yet to decide whether they would choose X or Y if freed from stat-
utory constraints—seems more plausible. This is especially true 
once we remember that “agencies are a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”154 For 
example, the agency’s general counsel might take the view that 
 
Administration, Truth in Savings, 58 Fed Reg 50394, 50430 (1993), amending various sec-
tions of CFR Title 12: 
The Board has been very concerned over the potential adverse effect that TISA 
and part 707 will have on small credit unions that have insufficient computer 
capacity to provide the statement disclosures required under § 707.6. . . . Unfor-
tunately, Congress, when it enacted TISA, gave the Board little leeway to miti-
gate the statute’s impact on such credit unions. 
See also Department of Justice, Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese Ancestry, 54 
Fed Reg 34157, 34158 (1989), amending 28 CFR Part 74: 
Unfortunately, however, section 108(2) of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 limits the 
definition of an “eligible individual” specifically to “any individual of Japanese an-
cestry.” Indeed, the focus throughout the Act is on those of Japanese ancestry 
and the discrimination they suffered based on their race. In light of the specific-
ity with which Congress has spoken and its focus on the racial discrimination 
suffered, it must be concluded that the statute authorizes compensation be paid 
only to those of Japanese ancestry, and not to those who are of non-Japanese 
ancestry but who were nevertheless interned. 
 . . . Therefore, the Department will submit legislation to the Congress to 
amend the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 to render eligible those non-Japanese fam-
ily members who suffered the effects of the government’s internment policy by 
accompanying their spouses or children of Japanese ancestry through the evac-
uation and internment process. 
 153 See, for example, Meshal v Higgenbotham, 804 F3d 417, 431 (DC Cir 2015) (Kavanaugh 
concurring) (“If I were a Member of Congress, I might vote to enact a new tort cause of 
action to cover a case like Meshal’s. But as judges, we do not get to make that decision.”); 
Caterpillar, Inc v International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Im-
plement Workers of America, 107 F3d 1052, 1066 (3d Cir 1997) (en banc) (Alito dissenting) 
(“If I were a legislator, I would not vote to criminalize the payments to grievance chairmen 
that are at issue here. . . . Our job, however, is to interpret Section 302 as it is written.”) 
(paragraph break omitted). 
 154 See Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power within Agencies, 120 
Yale L J 1032, 1036–38 (2011). 
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the statute unambiguously means X, while other offices (and of-
ficers) within the agency are divided as to whether X or Y is the 
better policy. Under these circumstances, the path of least re-
sistance might be for the agency to say, “We think the statute un-
ambiguously means X,” and then if the court disagrees, competing 
constituencies within the agency can duke it out over whether the 
agency should take position X or position Y. In other words, an 
agency’s failure to argue in the alternative may be part of an in-
ternal conflict-avoidance strategy.155 
C. Intra-agency Politics 
A third reason why Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases con-
tinue to crop up may be that agency general counsels are using 
statutory interpretation to enhance their own power and the 
power of their patrons. According to former EPA general counsel 
E. Donald Elliott, lawyers in the general counsel’s office at an 
agency can give advice on statutory meaning to other agency offi-
cials in one of two forms: (a) lawyers can give “legal advice as a 
point estimate, e.g., ‘the statute means this,’” or (b) lawyers can 
describe the “policy space” that the statute allows—that is, the 
“range of permissible interpretive discretion, within which a va-
riety of decisions that the agency might make would be legally 
defensible to varying degrees.”156 Option (a) means much more 
power for the general counsel, who then gets to define the 
agency’s position. Even if she selects option (a), the general coun-
sel’s word is not necessarily the last, but other agency actors are 
much more likely to defer to the general counsel’s position if she 
says, “You must do X or we will lose in court,” than if she says, 
“You can do X or Y, and I think X is the better choice.”157 
To be sure, the general counsel could try to thread the needle 
by telling other agency officials: “We must do X or else we will lose 
in court, but it would help us win in court if we say in our pream-
ble, ‘We would do X even if we had the option to do Y.’” But such 
 
 155 To be sure, the officials within the agency who favor position Y might also challenge 
the general counsel’s view that the statute unambiguously means X. On agency general 
counsels as “keepers of what the statute means,” see E. Donald Elliott, Chevron Matters: 
How the Chevron Doctrine Redefined the Roles of Congress, Courts and Agencies in Envi-
ronmental Law, 16 Vill Envir L J 1, 11 (2005). 
 156 Id at 11–12. 
 157 On the role of general counsels within administrative agencies, see Magill and 
Vermeule, 120 Yale L J at 1059–61 (cited in note 154); Jennifer Nou, Intra-agency Coordi-
nation, 129 Harv L Rev 421, 444–47 (2015). 
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a tack would, we assume, raise eyebrows, especially if some offi-
cials in the agency most assuredly would not choose X if Y were 
an option and do not see why they should have to say otherwise 
in support of a policy with which they disagree. The larger point, 
moreover, is that preambles are written for multiple audiences—
and not just for courts. One of those other audiences comprises 
agency officials beyond the general counsel’s office. A general 
counsel familiar with Chevron Step One-and-a-Half might decide 
that the added litigation risk from failing to argue in the alterna-
tive is worth it in order to maintain control of policy-making 
within the agency. In other words, agencies are “coalitions of di-
verse participants who have somewhat different motives” and 
who sometimes work at cross-purposes.158 
Dynamics of this sort might be particularly likely in an agency 
at which the preferences of the general counsel diverge from other 
actors’. At the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), for example, the president appoints the general counsel, 
but some of the commissioners may have been appointed by a 
prior president or be from a different political party.159 After the 
White House changes partisan hands, the general counsel may 
be an appointee of the new president while a majority of the 
Commission is composed of members of the other party. The gen-
eral counsel may have an incentive to say, “The statute unambig-
uously means X,” while knowing full well that a good chunk of the 
Commission would prefer position Y. Of course, the commission-
ers of the opposing party may challenge the general counsel’s stat-
utory interpretation, but the general counsel may decide that her 
best bet of winning the X-versus-Y fight is to say that the statute 
requires outcome X.160 And note that the relevant actor need not 
 
 158 James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in James Q. Wilson, ed, The Politics 
of Regulation 357, 373–74 (Basic Books 1980). See also Magill and Vermeule, 120 Yale L 
J at 1038 (cited in note 154) (“[T]he basic points are simple: agencies contain identifiable 
constituencies that affect policymaking, and these constituencies can, and do, come into 
conflict over the proper functioning of the agency.”). 
 159 See 42 USC § 2000e-4(a), (b)(1). 
 160 Of course, a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half issue arises only if the EEOC passes 
Chevron Step Zero. Some EEOC regulations—but not all—are considered Chevron eligible. 
Compare Federal Express Corp v Holowecki, 552 US 389, 395 (2008) (“The [EEOC] has 
statutory authority [under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act] to issue regula-
tions, . . . and when an agency invokes its authority to issue regulations, which then inter-
pret ambiguous statutory terms, the courts defer to its reasonable interpretations.”), with 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Arabian American Oil Co, 499 US 244, 
256–58 (1991) (reasoning that there is no Chevron deference to EEOC guidelines under 
Title VII). 
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be the general counsel: at agencies in which other offices wield 
control over the regulation-writing process, staffers in those of-
fices may state that an interpretation is statutorily compelled as 
a way to exert influence over the final product.161 
D. Intra–Executive Branch Politics 
Just as agencies are a “they,” not an “it,” so too for the executive 
branch more broadly.162 And these different parts of the executive 
branch may have different missions and goals.163 In some cases, 
these intra–executive branch conflicts may lay the foundation for 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases. For instance, an agency that 
foresees disagreement with OIRA as to a particular policy may 
have incentives to argue that the agency’s preference is compelled 
by Chevron Step One, and so it cannot do what OIRA would pre-
fer. (Of course, the White House also is a “they,” not an “it,” so the 
real world is even more complicated than this discussion lets on.164 
For purposes of our analysis here, however, it is sufficient to lump 
the White House and OIRA together.) 
For readers unfamiliar with the process of presidential re-
view, a bit of background may be helpful.165 In recent decades, the 
White House has attempted to assert greater control over the reg-
ulatory efforts of agencies.166 One of the key ways it has done so is 
through a series of executive orders vesting OIRA with the re-
sponsibility for reviewing agency actions. Among the first things 
that President Ronald Reagan did in office was issue Executive 
Order 12291, which required agencies to submit proposed and fi-
nal rules to the Office of Management and Budget (wherein OIRA 
 
 161 For the influence of career staffers over agency rules, see generally Daniel E. 
Walters, Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy: Administrative Law against Polit-
ical Control, 28 J L & Polit 129 (2013). 
 162 See Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive 
Branch Is a “They,” Not an “It”, 96 Minn L Rev 194, 197 (2011). 
 163 See, for example, Daniel A. Farber and Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of 
Administrative Law, 92 Tex L Rev 1137, 1138–40 (2014) (explaining how agencies and the 
White House may disagree on policy). 
 164 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and 
Realities, 126 Harv L Rev 1838, 1840, 1854, 1858 (2013). 
 165 For a more comprehensive overview, see generally Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-
Insulation under Presidential Review, 126 Harv L Rev 1755 (2013). 
 166 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L Rev 2245, 2248 (2001). 
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is housed).167 The order also required agencies to prepare a regu-
latory impact analysis for “major rules,” assessing the benefits and 
costs of the contemplated action.168 Thereafter, later presidents is-
sued a number of other additional executive orders on the subject—
including President Bill Clinton’s Executive Order 12866,169 which 
retained “the most important features of President Reagan’s over-
sight system” and further formalized OIRA’s regulatory review 
role,170 as well as President Barack Obama’s Executive Or-
der 13563, which “reaffirm[ed]” and supplemented Clinton’s or-
der.171 While President Donald Trump has issued a number of new 
executive orders addressing the regulatory process,172 he has thus 
far left the OIRA review infrastructure established by his prede-
cessors in place.173 
Relevant to Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, Executive Or-
der 13563 declares that “to the extent permitted by law, each 
agency must . . . select, in choosing among alternative regulatory 
approaches, those approaches that maximize net benefits.”174 The 
italicized language is important. If an agency concludes that ap-
proach Y would maximize net benefits but the statute allows only 
approach X, then Executive Order 13563 permits the agency to 
proceed with approach X.175 If the agency concludes, though, that 
the statute allows either X or Y, then Executive Order 13563 gen-
erally requires the agency to explain why X maximizes net benefits 
or else to choose Y. Thus, if an agency prefers X, it potentially has 
an incentive to say that the statute unambiguously requires X. 
 
 167 Executive Order 12291 § 3 (1981), 3 CFR 127, 128–30. Reagan later issued Exec-
utive Order 12498, which built upon the earlier order. See Executive Order 12498 (1985), 
3 CFR 323. 
 168 See Executive Order 12291 § 3(a), (d), 3 CFR at 128–29. 
 169 See Executive Order 12866 (1993), 3 CFR 638. 
 170 Kagan, 114 Harv L Rev at 2285 (cited in note 166). 
 171 Executive Order 13563 § 1(b) (2011), 3 CFR 215, 215. 
 172 See Executive Order 13771 § 1, 82 Fed Reg 9339, 9339 (2017) (providing that for 
every new regulation issued by an executive agency, two existing regulations must be 
“identified for elimination”); Executive Order 13777 §§ 2–3, 82 Fed Reg 12285, 12285–86 
(2017) (directing each executive agency to designate an agency official as a “Regulatory 
Reform Officer” and to convene a “Regulatory Reform Task Force”). 
 173 See Executive Order 13777 § 2(i)–(ii), 82 Fed Reg at 12285 (cited in note 172) 
(making specific reference to Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 and Obama’s Executive 
Order 13563). 
 174 Executive Order 13563 § 1(b), 3 CFR at 215 (emphasis added). 
 175 See Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretation in the Era of OIRA, 33 Fordham 
Urban L J 1097, 1100 (2006) (“From the beginning, [ ] it has been clear that, in reviewing 
the regulatory initiatives of its sister agencies, OIRA may not interfere with the agencies’ 
compliance with statutory directives.”). 
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To see how the strictures of Executive Order 13563 might 
give rise to Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases, imagine the fol-
lowing scenario: EPA prefers approach X over approach Y but 
strongly suspects that the OIRA administrator thinks that ap-
proach Y maximizes net benefits. (These sorts of disagreements 
are not uncommon, especially between EPA and the White 
House.)176 EPA can either (i) try to convince the OIRA adminis-
trator that the statute requires approach X or (ii) try to convince 
the OIRA administrator that in fact X is the benefit-maximizing 
course. EPA may decide that (i) is the more promising strategy—
perhaps because the OIRA administrator’s views on cost-benefit 
analysis are more fixed than her views on statutory interpreta-
tion.177 Accordingly, EPA may represent to OIRA that it is choos-
ing X because the statute requires that result, even though in 
reality the agency believes the statute is ambiguous. 
OIRA may still disagree with EPA’s statutory interpretation 
and instruct the agency to adopt approach Y. If so, there may not 
be a Chevron Step-One-and-a-Half scenario by the time the issue 
comes to court. And in theory, EPA could tell OIRA that the stat-
ute requires X while also inserting a statement into its preamble 
that the agency would choose X even if the statute were ambigu-
ous. But we imagine that the latter course once more would be 
difficult to pass by OIRA—especially if OIRA most certainly 
would not approve of X if it had a choice. Again, the agency’s chal-
lenge is that it has to write a preamble for multiple audiences. 
What the agency needs to say to get past OIRA review may not be 
the same as what it would say if it were strictly maximizing its 
chances of winning in court. 
 
 176 See, for example, Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on 
the Relationship between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 Pace Envir L 
Rev 325, 348 (2014): 
OIRA, in any event, lavishes skeptical attention on EPA’s estimates of regula-
tory costs. . . . And in my experience, OIRA personnel keep an eagle eye on 
EPA—on its public announcements, website, etc.—to make sure EPA does not 
sneak something past it. From OIRA’s perspective, the system appears to work: 
EPA receives more sustained attention from OIRA than any other federal 
agency. Most often, EPA is the agency with the largest number of rules under 
review at OIRA. 
 177 Indeed, it is worth noting that several OIRA administrators in the past have been 
nonlawyers, including James C. Miller III (1981), Wendy Lee Gramm (1985–1988), John 
Graham (2001–2006), and Susan Dudley (2007–2009) (though, of course, all have had the 
counsel of lawyers on OIRA’s staff). 
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E. Interbranch Politics 
Agency leaders, like anyone else,178 also presumably like to 
take credit for popular policies and avoid being blamed for unpop-
ular ones. This may be true for personal reasons (the agency head 
cares about her own legacy and post-office career prospects), in-
stitutional reasons (the agency head does not want her institution 
to be dragged through the mud in the media or in congressional 
hearings), or partisan reasons (the agency head wants her actions 
to reflect well on the president who appointed her). When an 
agency head feels that, for whatever reason, a policy is the best 
course even though it is unpopular, she might say, “Don’t look at 
us; we’re just doing what Congress required.” That is, an agency 
may announce in a preamble to a regulation that “the statute un-
ambiguously means X”—with no argument in the alternative—
because outcome X is widely disliked among favored constituents 
or the general public, and the agency head, who nonetheless 
thinks X is the right policy, wants both for X to go into effect and 
to pass the buck for it. 
Here, return again to the polar bear example. Prior to the DC 
federal district court’s November 2010 remand decision,179 the 
Fish and Wildlife Service could have said that it would adopt the 
same interpretation of “endangered” whether or not Congress 
compelled that interpretation. As it turns out, that would have 
been a useful weapon for the agency’s lawyers to wield in the in-
evitable litigation. But the agency said no such thing, at least un-
til it was forced to do so by the district court. Might the Service’s 
reluctance to take ownership of the interpretation until it was 
forced to do so be explained by the fact that many in the environ-
mental law community wanted the agency to take a more aggres-
sive position?180 The agency, already under attack by groups who 
 
 178 See, for example, Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of Symbolic Legislation: Percep-
tions and Realities of the New Burden-of-Proof Rules, 84 Iowa L Rev 413, 477 & n 281 
(1999) (“[L]egislators will try to shift blame to the IRS for the embarrassment of Congress’s 
own making.”). 
 179 See generally In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule 
Litigation, 748 F Supp 2d 19 (DDC 2010). 
 180 See Activists Slam Salazar’s ESA Decision (Clean Air Report, May 14, 2009) (avail-
able on Westlaw at 2009 WLNR 9095136) (“Activists and Democrats are criticizing Interior 
Secretary Ken Salazar’s just-announced decision to uphold a controversial Bush admin-
istration rule on polar bear protections that limits the government’s ability to use the En-
dangered Species Act (ESA) to regulate greenhouse gases.”). Note that the polar bear list-
ing rule was initially promulgated by the Bush administration, which may have been less 
reliant on environmentalist constituencies. See Josey Ballenger, Bush’s Choice of EPA Ad-
visers Signals Tilt toward Industry (Center for Public Integrity, Feb 12, 2001), archived at 
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could be political allies, quite likely had an incentive to say, in 
effect, “Don’t blame us; we were just following the law,” rather 
than accept responsibility for a controversial policy decision. 
To be sure, a buck-shifting agency could say, “Don’t look at us; 
Congress made us do X. And oh, by the way, if Congress hadn’t 
made us do X, we would have done X anyway.” But for obvious rea-
sons, we doubt that this would be an effective blame-minimization 
strategy. Thus, the agency leader may face an unenviable choice: 
(a) minimize blame by attributing X entirely to Congress, or 
(b) minimize litigation risk while taking some ownership of the X 
result. When agency heads take the former course, they run the 
risk of a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remand. But if X is suffi-
ciently unpopular, or if the prospect of litigation is sufficiently un-
likely or distant, then that may be a risk they are willing to take.181 
F. Interadministration Politics 
Finally, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases may sometimes 
arise because agency leaders are trying to bind their successors.182 
Say that an agency head prefers policy X but is worried that a 
future administration may choose Y. The agency head may want 
a rule’s preamble to say that “the statute unambiguously means 
X”—without any argument in the alternative—for two reasons. 
First, the agency head may worry that arguing in the alternative 
will alert future agency leaders to the possibility of choosing a pol-
icy other than X. We doubt the efficacy of this strategy, though: if 
the successor is reasonably sophisticated, then the successor will 
presumably notice that the statutory language is not so clear-cut. 
Second, and more effectively, the agency head may realize 
that the best way of preserving policy X is to secure a court de-
cision holding that the statute unambiguously means X. As the 
Supreme Court stated in National Cable & Telecommunications 
 
http://perma.cc/3JWG-MM6G. Our political explanation accounts for why the Obama ad-
ministration stuck to the Bush administration’s course—though not necessarily why the 
Bush administration framed the statute as unambiguous in the first place. As to the latter 
point (or, chronologically, the former point in time), see the next Section’s discussion of 
interadministration politics. 
 181 Of course, there are other possible interbranch political dynamics. For instance, 
perhaps Congress—if it dislikes what the agency has done—may seize on a Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half decision to castigate the agency; losing is not popular. Needless to say, 
how the branches interact is a complicated subject that merits careful examination. 
 182 On efforts by agencies to entrench their policy preferences before the handover to 
a new administration, see generally Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching 
Policies and Personnel before a New President Arrives, 78 NYU L Rev 557 (2003). 
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Association v Brand X Internet Services,183 “A court’s prior judi-
cial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction oth-
erwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court deci-
sion holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous 
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discre-
tion.”184 That is, if a court says that the statute unambiguously 
means X as a Chevron Step One matter, then the agency later in 
time lacks the option of changing its policy to Y (unless, of course, 
it also can convince a later-in-time court to overrule the earlier 
court’s decision—itself a particularly difficult task in light of the 
“enhanced force” of stare decisis in statutory interpretation 
cases185). Yet if the agency offers an argument in the alternative, 
then a reviewing court could more easily sidestep the Chevron 
Step One issue and jump straight to Chevron Step Two.186 In that 
event, the agency head would not get what she is hoping for: a 
precedent on the books saying that X is the agency’s only option. 
By maintaining that the statute unambiguously means X and 
refusing to argue in the alternative, the agency forces—or at least 
pushes—a court to decide the Chevron Step One question. And if 
the agency thinks that it is likely to face a relatively sympathetic 
court in the near term, then this strategy may be a rational one. 
Even if the composition of the relevant court changes over time, 
the holding by today’s court that the statute unambiguously 
means X carries stare decisis effect. The agency’s refusal to argue 
in the alternative may thus be part of a bet with a large potential 
upside. If the agency faces what it perceives to be a sympathetic 
court in the present period, then pressing that court toward a 
Chevron Step One resolution may mean that the current agency’s 
views of good policy will end up being locked in, even if the 
agency’s personnel (and policy preferences) were to change, and 
even if the court’s personnel and preferences were to change. That 
is a valuable asset—one almost as good as an act of Congress en-
shrining the current agency’s preference.187 
 
 183 545 US 967 (2005). 
 184 Id at 982. 
 185 Kimble v Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S Ct 2401, 2409 (2015). 
 186 See, for example, Stryker v Securities and Exchange Commission, 780 F3d 163, 
166 (2d Cir 2015) (“We need not, however, decide if Congress clearly intended to bar a 
whistleblower award to petitioner at Chevron Step 1 because even if Dodd–Frank is am-
biguous, we defer to the SEC’s interpretation of Dodd–Frank at Step 2.”). 
 187 See generally Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U Chi L Rev (forthcoming 
2018), archived at http://perma.cc/BU26-BCV2. 
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And note that while the potential upside is large, the down-
side may be minimal. If a court remands the rule to the agency on 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half grounds, then the agency always 
has the option of coming back and saying that it chooses X as a 
matter of discretion. Or, at least, almost always: near the end of 
an administration, there may not be time for the agency to sup-
plement its initial preamble in the event of a Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half remand. Then again, if the administration is in its 
waning days and its successor is unsympathetic to policy X, then 
policy X may not be long for this world anyway. Thus, one can see 
why this “bet” is potentially attractive: At worst, the agency that 
adopts this strategy allows a court to strike down a rule that 
would have been rescinded by the next administration in any 
event. At best, the agency wins a Chevron Step One ruling that 
binds subsequent administrations for the foreseeable future. 
IV.  THE BENEFITS OF CHEVRON STEP ONE-AND-A-HALF 
The previous Part listed several hypotheses as to why Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half cases might continue to arise. And we have 
argued that, at least sometimes, agency actors may have an in-
centive to maintain that a statute is unambiguous even when 
such a claim harms the agency in litigation. On this view, the fact 
that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases continue to arise is 
hardly nonsensical. Agencies may have good strategic reasons for 
doing what they do. 
Even so, an important question lingers: Does the Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half doctrine make sense? Professor Bagley, for 
instance, has argued not: “the norm in Prill cases” is “needless 
punishment” for agencies guilty of nothing more than a foot 
fault.188 Indeed, wrote Bagley: 
Rigid adherence to Prill won’t make agencies better at spot-
ting latent ambiguities. In all likelihood, agencies will carry 
on much as they would in the absence of Prill, deaf to its mar-
ginal incentive effects. To the extent agencies do pay atten-
tion, their decisions will become bloated with boilerplate legal 
analysis. Chenery does not demand—and should not be read 
to demand—that kind of waste.189 
 
 188 Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 300 (cited in note 12). 
 189 Id at 301. 
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We are sympathetic toward Bagley’s position insofar as he 
argues that “Chenery does not demand” that Chevron deference 
be limited to cases in which the agency acknowledges ambiguity. 
As we observed above, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is compati-
ble with, but perhaps not compelled by, Chenery I. And yet we are 
not convinced that the doctrine is a “waste.” In particular, here 
we show that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half can serve a useful 
purpose—or, rather, that it can serve useful purposes, with the 
purpose depending on the different reasons why agencies might 
insist that ambiguous statutes are clear. Whether these benefits 
outweigh the costs of additional remands and further litigation is 
a harder question—one that we cannot claim to resolve here. 
What we can say, though, is that the purposes served by Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half ought not be ignored in the calculus. 
A. Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as a Response to Agency 
Ignorance 
The case for Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is perhaps the 
hardest to make when the issue arises due to the agency’s igno-
rance of the doctrine. Imagine that an agency genuinely prefers 
position X over position Y but says that it is adopting position X 
because “the statute compels X,” when in fact the statute merely 
permits X but could also be read to mean Y. In this scenario, what 
good does it do for the court to remand to the agency just so that 
the agency can promptly turn around and jot off a supplemental 
document explaining why it hews to position X as an exercise of 
discretion? 
Even in this most difficult scenario, however, we can think of 
at least two reasons for applying the Chevron Step One-and-a-
Half doctrine. First, even if the agency general counsel understands 
that the statute can be read to mean X or Y—and even if the state-
ment that “the statute compels X” was simply an ill-advised way to 
explain that X is the agency’s chosen policy—one might be con-
cerned that other actors within the agency lack the same 
knowledge as the general counsel. Other agency officials might 
believe that the general counsel’s statement—“the statute com-
pels X”—is an indication that anything other than X would be un-
lawful. Indeed, it strikes us as unlikely that (a) the general coun-
sel would lack the administrative law knowledge to understand 
that the statement “the statute compels X” sets the agency up for 
a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half problem, but (b) agency actors 
outside the general counsel’s office (including nonlawyers) would 
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be so sophisticated on matters of administrative law as to under-
stand that the statement “the statute compels X” actually means 
that X and Y are both options. Put differently, our worry is that 
even if the agency’s Chevron Step One-and-a-Half error was en-
tirely innocent, actors within the agency will fail to understand 
that the statute actually allows option Y. Under these circum-
stances, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half serves to ensure that the 
general counsel does not short-circuit the agency’s internal policy-
making process with an erroneous assertion that the statute is 
clear. 
Even if one is not persuaded by this first justification, how-
ever, the second is perhaps stronger: instances of agency igno-
rance will be difficult to distinguish from instances of agency am-
bivalence or strategic maneuvering. As we argue below, the 
argument in favor of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is strongest 
under those latter circumstances. And applying Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half in cases of agency ignorance may be necessary so 
that the court does not also uphold the agency’s rule in cases of 
ambivalence or strategic maneuvering. 
Concededly, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remands in cases 
of agency ignorance may lead to waste in some instances. It is 
entirely possible that the X-versus-Y decision was fully vetted by 
the relevant actors within the agency, and that the general coun-
sel—failing to understand the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doc-
trine—approved a preamble that characterized the choice of X as 
compelled by Congress. Yet we would hope (and, indeed, expect) 
that such an occurrence would be a one-off event, and that agency 
lawyers would quickly learn to draft their preambles more care-
fully. If Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases recur (and especially 
if the same agency runs afoul of the doctrine on multiple occa-
sions), then one should begin to suspect that agencies are failing 
to acknowledge ambiguity for reasons other than innocence or ig-
norance. If so, then—as discussed below—the case for Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half grows significantly stronger. 
B. Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as a Response to Agency 
Ambivalence 
The second possible cause of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
cases that we mentioned above is agency ambivalence: while 
agency officials believe that the statute compels X, those officials 
have yet to decide whether they would prefer X or Y if freed from 
statutory constraints (or, perhaps, they actually prefer Y). The 
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case for Chevron Step One-and-a-Half under these conditions is 
straightforward: If the agency selected policy X because it misin-
terpreted the relevant statute, and if the agency would not (or 
might not) hew to X if liberated from its misapprehension, then why 
allow the agency’s choice of X to carry the force of law? Even then-
Judge Roberts, a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half skeptic, acknowl-
edged that a remand is appropriate in these circumstances: 
[W]hen an agency erroneously concludes that a statutory in-
terpretation is required by Congress, we should remand to 
give the agency an opportunity to interpret the statute in the 
first instance. That course is consistent with principles of 
Chevron deference, and with the respect due Congress’s del-
egation of interpretive authority to the agency.190 
Bagley has argued that cases of this sort are “rare.”191 But 
they are not unheard of. In 1997, the Federal Communications 
Commission considered a provision of the Communications Act,192 
as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996,193 that tem-
porarily forbid any “Bell operating company” from acquiring an 
“alarm monitoring service entity”;194 the Commission concluded 
that this term was “unambiguous” and that the prohibition ap-
plied only to the takeover of an entity with “independent legal ex-
istence.”195 Later that year, the DC Circuit remanded the matter 
to the FCC on Chevron Step One-and-a-Half grounds: in the 
court’s view, the term “alarm monitoring service entity” was am-
biguous, and the statutory prohibition might (though need not) 
apply to the acquisition of an unincorporated operating division 
as well.196 Given the chance at a do-over, the FCC turned on a 
 
 190 PDK Laboratories Inc v United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362 F3d 
786, 808 (DC Cir 2004) (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 191 Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 300 n 326 (cited in note 12). 
 192 48 Stat 1064 (1934), codified as amended in various sections of Title 47. 
 193 Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, codified as amended in various sections of Title 47. 
 194 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 275(a), 110 Stat at 105, codified at 47 USC § 275(a). 
 195 In the Matter of Enforcement of Section 275(a)(2) of the Communications Act of 
1934, as Amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, against Ameritech Corp, 12 FCC 
Rec 3855, 3859 (1997). 
 196 Alarm Industry Communications Committee v Federal Communications Commission, 
131 F3d 1066, 1068–72 (DC Cir 1997). 
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dime and said that an unincorporated operating division was in-
deed an “alarm monitoring service entity” for purposes of the 
provision.197 
Somewhat surprisingly, the same pattern repeats itself with 
respect to two other FCC determinations from the same year: 
1997. In one case, the FCC determined that § 254(g) of the Tele-
communications Act—which requires certain providers of tele-
communications services to offer uniform rates to customers 
across states198—applied to providers of commercial mobile radio 
services.199 The DC Circuit later vacated the FCC’s order because 
the agency erroneously believed that § 254(g) unambiguously ap-
plied to commercial mobile radio services providers.200 The FCC 
then reversed itself: “Exercising our authority to interpret this 
ambiguous provision,” the Commission said, “we find that the ap-
proach more faithful to the spirit of the statutory rate integration 
requirement is that . . . the requirement does not apply to [com-
mercial mobile radio services] providers.”201 Also in 1997, the FCC 
determined that it was barred by Congress from collecting a regu-
latory fee from the congressionally chartered satellite communica-
tions provider Comsat.202 Another operator of telecommunications 
satellites, PanAmStat, challenged Comsat’s exemption; the DC 
Circuit determined that “the FCC was mistaken in its conclusion 
that the statute compelled an exemption for Comsat”;203 and on 
remand, the FCC, exercising its newfound discretion, decided to 
charge Comsat $1.6 million in fees.204 
Moreover, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remands can serve 
important purposes even when they do not spur the agency to re-
verse course 180 degrees. For example, a remand might (and 
 
 197 See In the Matter of Enforcement of Section 275(a)(2) of the Communications Act 
of 1934, as Amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, against Ameritech Corp, 13 
FCC Rec 19046, 19052 (1998). 
 198 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 254(g), 110 Stat at 73, codified as amended at 
47 USC § 254(g). 
 199 See GTE Service Corp v Federal Communications Commission, 224 F3d 768, 770–
71 (DC Cir 2000). 
 200 Id at 775–76. 
 201 In the Matter of South Seas Broadcasting, Inc, 26 FCC Rec 4164, 4167 (2011). 
 202 PanAmSat Corp v Federal Communications Commission, 198 F3d 890, 892–94 
(DC Cir 1999). 
 203 Id at 896. 
 204 Comsat Corp v Federal Communications Commission, 283 F3d 344, 346–47 (DC 
Cir 2002). 
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sometimes does205) lead an agency to make substantive alterations 
to a prior rule without changing direction entirely. And even if an 
agency reaches the same result on remand, while doing so it may 
also gain additional knowledge that will have spillover effects on 
other policies. For instance, imagine an agency that is ambivalent 
about its preferred policy when it first announces its view that the 
statute is unambiguous (for example, it tentatively thinks that if 
it had discretion, it would choose X, but it is not sure). Forcing the 
agency to drill down and really decide for sure that it wants X 
rather than Y increases the agency’s knowledge of what it is reg-
ulating, and so also its expertise. And the fact that the agency has 
been given this discretion suggests, under the implied delegation 
theory of Chevron, that Congress wants the agency to undertake 
that learning process rather than simply free ride on the stat-
ute.206 To a reviewing court (or a skeptical professor), it may look 
like nothing has changed—the agency ended up in the same place 
it began. Only now the agency knows for certain what it thinks 
because it has done its homework.207 
Even so, we obviously agree with Bagley that, in most cases, 
an agency that says in the first instance that “the statute compels 
X” will, following a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remand, adopt 
position X as an exercise of discretion. Yet we doubt that courts 
can separate out these cases from ones in which a remand will 
indeed cause the agency to change course, either with regard to 
 
 205 See, for example, Coalition for Common Sense in Government Procurement v 
United States, 671 F Supp 2d 48, 56 (DDC 2009); Coalition for Common Sense in Govern-
ment Procurement v United States, 821 F Supp 2d 275, 279 n 4 (DDC 2011). 
 206 See, for example, PDK Laboratories, 362 F3d at 797–98 (explaining that Chevron 
Step Two requires that the agency “must bring its experience and expertise to bear in light 
of competing interests at stake”). 
 207 Given “logrolling” within an agency (that is, trading votes across issues), Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half may affect outcomes on the ground in other ways. See Jim Rossi, 
Book Review, Public Choice Theory and the Fragmented Web of the Contemporary Admin-
istrative State, 96 Mich L Rev 1746, 1753 & n 32 (1998); Glen Staszewski, Textualism and 
the Executive Branch, 2009 Mich St L Rev 143, 170. An agency general counsel’s assertion 
that a statute is unambiguous may take the relevant issue off the table for purposes of 
intra-agency bargaining, whereas if the issue were the subject of bargaining, the agency’s 
position not on that particular issue but on other issues might change. Imagine that on 
Issue 1, the agency chooses between options X and Y, while on Issue 2, the agency chooses 
between options P and Q. If the agency general counsel says that the statute compels X, 
then the forces in favor of P may prevail in the P-versus-Q debate. If, however, a court 
remands on the ground that the statute allows for X or Y, relevant actors within the agency 
who favor X over Y may agree to support option Q over P in return for others within the 
agency coming around to the X position. The court’s Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remand 
on the X-versus-Y question may have no effect on that particular issue, but may sway the 
outcome from P to Q. 
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the same rule or with regard to another rule altogether. Reliance 
on the agency’s representations in litigation is itself an unreliable 
approach: the positions adopted by attorneys who represent the 
agency in court—oftentimes Justice Department lawyers rather 
than agency employees—may not reflect the views of all the 
agency actors who might have the opportunity to weigh in on re-
mand.208 In any event, even if agency leaders do sign off on the 
litigators’ strategy, the agency’s learning process would still be 
short-circuited, because the process of signing off on a lawyer’s 
call is not the same as deliberately considering a policy through a 
more structured rulemaking process. 
C. Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as a Response to Strategic 
Behavior 
In Part III, we suggested that an agency’s failure to argue in 
the alternative that it would arrive at the same position as an 
exercise of discretion does not necessarily reflect ignorance or am-
bivalence. We proffered four potential strategic explanations—
rooted in intra-agency, intra–executive branch, interbranch, and 
interadministration politics—that might account for the observed 
phenomenon. Here, we argue that if indeed Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half cases arise because of any of these first three strategic 
reasons, then the justification for the doctrine is especially sound. 
(We address the possibility of interadministration strategic be-
havior in Part IV.D.) 
Start with the first of these strategic explanations: an 
agency’s general counsel may maintain that the statute compels 
X so as to exert greater control over the intra-agency decision-
making process. For adherents to the implied delegation theory 
of Chevron, this is an obvious problem. Congress generally dele-
gates authority to agency leaders or to the agency as a whole,209 
not to the agency general counsel. We struggle to see any reason 
why it is normatively desirable—or acceptable—for lawyers 
within an agency to use their privileged positions to impose policy 
preferences to which other agency actors might object. Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half helps deter this sort of behavior, although 
in an admittedly messy way: it imposes a cost on the agency as a 
whole (the cost of responding to a remand) when actors within the 
 
 208 See Sunstein, 126 Harv L Rev at 1855 (cited in note 164). 
 209 See David J. Barron and Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 S 
Ct Rev 201, 238. 
04 HEMEL&NIELSON_ART_IC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2017  9:58 PM 
808  The University of Chicago Law Review [84:757 
   
agency attempt to paper over the possibility that the statute al-
lows for other options. 
The notion of agency lawyers asserting that a statute is un-
ambiguous in order to squeeze other actors out of the decision-
making process is equally problematic—if not more so—under the 
expertise account of Chevron. The Supreme Court has said that 
“practical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications 
behind Chevron deference”;210 such practical (and often technical) 
expertise is likely to be found in parts of the agency beyond the 
general counsel’s office. Courts have reason to doubt that such 
expertise will be brought to bear on a policy question when the 
general counsel comes out of the gate saying that a particular re-
sult is legally required. 
Next, consider the possibility that Chevron Step One-and-a-
Half cases arise as a by-product of agencies attempting to avoid 
reversal by OIRA. Critics of OIRA’s role in the regulatory process 
might be willing to countenance this outcome.211 Adherents to the 
accountability theory of Chevron, however, will find it perturbing. 
The accountability theory of Chevron is based on the twin prem-
ises that agencies are accountable to the chief executive and that 
the chief executive is accountable to voters. OIRA review of 
agency action justifies the first of these twin premises.212 Agency 
circumvention of OIRA review undermines that same premise. 
The more we take the accountability discussion in Chevron seri-
ously, the stronger the argument for Chevron Step One-and-a-
Half becomes. 
In a similar vein, adherents to the accountability theory of 
Chevron might be concerned about agency preambles attributing 
to Congress policy decisions that agency officials have made 
themselves. If the theory undergirding Chevron is that voters 
should be the judges of the executive branch’s policy choices, then 
presumably the executive branch should have to take ownership 
of those policy choices so that voters know whom to blame (and to 
credit). To be sure, we doubt whether citizens are consulting the 
Federal Register along with the League of Women Voters’ Guide 
before they head to the polls.213 And yet accountability theories 
 
 210 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp v The LTV Corp, 496 US 633, 651–52 (1990). 
 211 See generally, for example, Heinzerling, 33 Fordham Urban L J 1097 (cited in 
note 175). 
 212 See Kagan, 114 Harv L Rev at 2376 (cited in note 166). 
 213 For a broader critique of accountability arguments in administrative law, see gen-
erally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Discounting Accountability (unpublished manuscript, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/M7GF-URYZ. 
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need not rely on electoral accountability as the exclusive transmis-
sion belt. We might take a more pluralistic approach and imagine 
interest groups, media organizations, and other sophisticated ac-
tors attributing credit and blame across branches based in part 
on agencies’ characterizations of their own degrees of freedom.214 
If this is the case, then an agency’s assertion that the relevant 
statute is unambiguous may serve an accountability-deflecting 
function. Granted, this argument depends on those who evaluate 
agencies (1) being sophisticated enough to distinguish, based on 
a preamble or similar document, whether the agency believes its 
action to be compelled by Congress, but (2) not being so sophisti-
cated as to arrive at their own conclusion as to whether the 
agency’s action is congressionally compelled. These two condi-
tions may strike some readers as implausible. Yet when the 
stakes are high and many people are watching, an agency may be 
happy for any blame it can avoid, even if it cannot avoid all of it. 
For all these reasons, we might be concerned about an agency 
(or the rule-writing lawyers within an agency) characterizing a 
statute as unambiguous when a fairer reading is that the statute 
affords the agency substantial discretion. And yet there is one 
more step in the logic before these concerns lead to a justification 
for Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. Arguably, a court could miti-
gate at least some of these concerns with a thorough opinion ex-
plaining that the relevant statute is ambiguous and yet uphold-
ing the agency’s interpretation as permissible. Assuming that 
the relevant individuals—nonlawyers within the agency, staff-
ers at OIRA, and the external actors assigning credit or blame 
to Congress or the executive branch—read the opinion as well as 
the preamble (or read synopses of each), then the court could at 
least alert these individuals that X is not compelled and that Y re-
mains an option. And an opinion would do so without the disrup-
tion of a remand, thus partially addressing Bagley’s and Roberts’s 
concerns about “waste[ful]” rounds of “ping-pong.”215 
There are, however, two reasons to doubt the corrective 
power of an opinion that identifies a statutory ambiguity but does 
not remand to the agency. First, the agency’s initial selection of X 
over Y sets the status quo to X, and the status quo may be a sticky 
one. Actors within the agency who would prefer Y may be in a 
 
 214 See, for example, Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 Minn L 
Rev 1253, 1271–77 (2009) (explaining “Partial, Proxy, and Direct Political Accountability” 
theories). 
 215 See text accompanying notes 19 and 189. 
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weaker position to advocate for their preference once X is in place 
than when the X-versus-Y decision is incipient. This is not unlike 
what happens within Congress; because (by design) it is so hard 
to run the lawmaking gauntlet, there is a heavy status quo bias.216 
So too with agencies; in a world of “ossification” of significant 
rules,217 it can be difficult to do all the work that is required to 
unwind an administrative decision. It thus is quite unlikely, for 
instance, that language in a judicial opinion—language not 
backed up by a judgment—will restart the OIRA review process 
and force the agency to justify X over Y on the basis of cost-benefit 
analysis and presidential priorities. In short, an after-the-fact ju-
dicial opinion announcing that the relevant statute is ambiguous 
will not entirely negate the ability of agency officials (and, in par-
ticular, agency lawyers) to impose their preferences in ways not 
contemplated by Chevron. 
Second, many agency actions do not result in litigation, and 
in all but the most exceptional cases, the probability of litigation 
is less than unity. (And even if the probability of litigation is one, 
there is no guarantee that the plaintiffs will raise and properly 
preserve a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half argument.) If an agency 
can assert that a statute is unambiguous and face only the conse-
quence of a judicial slap on the wrist, then the incentive for agen-
cies (and agency lawyers) to take this tack will be stronger. If 
agency leaders (or agency lawyers) prefer X and know that there 
is no real sting from telling intra-agency constituencies, OIRA, 
and the public that X is the only option allowed by the statute, 
then—well—why not? Critical language in a judicial opinion may 
be embarrassing to the agency, but, at the same time, the odds of 
that language being written are long; there must be litigation (no 
foregone conclusion), and the court must resolve the case against 
the agency on Chevron Step One-and-a-Half grounds (as opposed 
to on any other outcome-determinative issue). If judicial review 
amounts to nothing more than a chance—not even a certainty—of 
 
 216 See Jacob E. Gersen and Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 
156 U Pa L Rev 923, 936–37 (2008) (“The future legislature can always repeal or alter the 
program, but once regulations have been implemented, some form of status quo bias may 
make it marginally harder to eliminate them—especially during periods of divided govern-
ment.”). Consider also John F. Manning, Lawmaking Made Easy, 10 Green Bag 2d 191 
(2007) (“The cumbersomeness of the process seems obviously suited to interests that con-
tradict the ‘more is better’ attitude that has come to be almost an unconscious assumption 
of public law.”). 
 217 See generally Richard J. Pierce Jr, Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to 
Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 Geo Wash L Rev 1493 (2012). 
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harsh words, it is easy to imagine the cost-benefit analysis cutting 
against acknowledging statutory ambiguity. Hence one of the key 
benefits of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half: remands under Step 
One-and-a-Half impose a cost on agencies that is borne in part by 
the agency leaders and lawyers likely to make the decision 
whether to acknowledge ambiguity in the preamble. 
So what Roberts referred to as “ping-pong” and Bagley con-
sidered a “waste” might instead be a necessary element of an op-
timal deterrence approach: yes, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half re-
mands impose costs on agencies, but those are costs meant to 
discourage agencies from ascribing policy choices to Congress that 
Congress has delegated to the agencies. This point is especially 
forceful when one remembers that agencies and courts are repeat 
players. Given this dynamic, a remand in one case may very well 
have beneficial systemic effects for a host of other cases.218 
This raises the question: How costly should Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half remands be? When an agency says in the pream-
ble to a rule that the statute compels X rather than Y and the 
court concludes that X and Y are both permissible interpretations 
of the statute, then the court could: 
(1) Do nothing so long as the agency represents in litigation 
that it in fact prefers X (the Roberts/Bagley approach); 
(2) Remand to the agency but leave the rule in place for the 
time being; 
 
 218 So far, we have been operating under the assumption that other actors within the 
agency are unaware of the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doctrine. Relaxing this assump-
tion leads to a further argument in Chevron Step One-and-a-Half’s favor. This is because 
even if other actors within the agency are sufficiently sophisticated to understand the con-
tours of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, it may still be the case that the agency general 
counsel, by virtue of the legal expertise at her disposal, remains the agency actor best able 
to predict how a court will interpret a statute. For this reason, other agency actors may 
value the general counsel’s opinion as to whether a statute unambiguously means X. But 
in the absence of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, the general counsel’s assertion that “the 
statute unambiguously means X” is cheap talk: other actors within the agency have little 
reason to credit the general counsel’s assertion, given that the assertion is costless from 
the general counsel’s perspective. With Chevron Step One-and-a-Half in the background, 
other agency actors may be more likely to believe the general counsel’s assertion that “the 
statute unambiguously means X,” because if the reviewing court concludes otherwise, a 
remand will impose costs on the agency general counsel (for example, the costs of further 
rulemaking proceedings and potential litigation). Thus, by attaching a cost to the general 
counsel’s assertion regarding a statute’s unambiguous meaning, the Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half doctrine potentially allows for more efficient intra-agency information sharing. 
That is, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half may allow the general counsel to communicate her 
interpretation of the statute’s meaning to other agency actors—and to do so credibly. 
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(3) Remand to the agency and vacate the rule; or 
(4) Impose Y as a penalty for the agency’s failure to 
acknowledge ambiguity. 
We explore in Part V.B the advantages and disadvantages 
of each of these options. But before addressing the question of 
remedy in Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases, we take up the 
last of the strategic reasons why agencies might put themselves 
in a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half box: the “interadministration 
politics” possibility. 
D. Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as an Invitation for Strategic 
Agency Behavior 
We noted above that agencies might insist that a statute un-
ambiguously means X so as to secure a holding that the statute 
indeed means X (and only X). If the agency can get a reviewing 
court to say that the statute means X, that locks X in place against 
modification by future agencies.219 Of course, this gambit might, 
in some cases, result in a remand should the court conclude that 
the statute could mean X or Y. And yet, in one sense, Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half actually aids the agency’s strategy in these 
sorts of cases, because the doctrine prevents the reviewing court 
from skipping to Chevron Step Two. 
To elaborate: Imagine that a statute might mean X or Y, the 
agency prefers X over Y, and the agency fears that a future ad-
ministration might prefer Y over X. The agency also thinks that 
the relevant reviewing court is generally minimalist, and so will 
rule (in the agency’s favor) on Chevron Step Two grounds if given 
the option. Finally, the agency thinks that the reviewing court, as 
currently composed, is likely to rule in favor of the agency at 
Chevron Step One today if forced to confront the Step One issue—
but that if a future administration switches to position Y, the re-
viewing court later in time might not strike down the future 
agency’s action on Chevron Step One grounds. (This could be be-
cause the agency believes that the composition of the court might 
change, or because the agency believes that, all else equal, the 
court is more likely to go along with the agency’s position than go 
against it.) 
 
 219 See Gersen and O’Connell, 156 U Pa L Rev at 936 (cited in note 216) (noting ten-
sion between present and future versions of the agency). 
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Under these circumstances, the agency might want to force 
a Chevron Step One decision today. But in the absence of the 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half doctrine, the agency would have 
trouble doing so. Even if the agency insists that the statute un-
ambiguously means X, a court in a world without Step One-and-
a-Half would have the option of skipping straight to Chevron Step 
Two. And that, of course, would thwart the agency’s entrench-
ment strategy. 
Should the possibility that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
might facilitate this sort of strategic behavior curb our enthusi-
asm for the doctrine? Perhaps—but probably not by much. While 
we believe that some amount of strategic behavior by agencies 
might explain some number of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
cases, the amount of plotting involved in this last scenario strikes 
us as House of Cards-esque. This is not to rule out the possibility 
that Frank Underwood types might be found in some agency gen-
eral counsel’s offices (and, indeed, we suspect that agency lawyers 
are engaged in strategic maneuvering to some extent, especially 
for high-profile decisions220). But although it is imperfect, we 
think the better response to this last gambit would be for the re-
viewing court to reject the agency’s attempt to force a Chevron 
Step One ruling unless the court believes that the statute is in 
fact unambiguous—in which case a ruling to that effect strikes us 
as entirely appropriate. 
E. Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as an Invitation for Strategic 
Judicial Behavior 
Our analysis would not be complete without mentioning one 
last concern: the possibility that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
might add to the power of courts, potentially in undesirable ways. 
So far, our analysis has discussed the strategic reasons (among 
others) why an agency may say that a statute is unambiguous 
while a court later concludes that the same statute is ambiguous. 
But might not Chevron Step One-and-a-Half open up new strate-
gic opportunities for the court as well? Imagine that the agency 
prefers to read a statute to mean X, while a court prefers for the 
same statute to mean Y. If the agency says that the statute un-
ambiguously means X, then without Chevron Step One-and-a-
Half, the court would have two statutory interpretation options: 
 
 220 See Nielson, 105 Georgetown L J at 979–82 (cited in note 87) (listing examples of 
strategic behavior). 
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(1) uphold the agency’s interpretation or (2) say that the agency’s 
interpretation is not a “permissible” reading.221 The second option 
may be costly for the court, perhaps because the claim that X is 
an impermissible reading of the statute is difficult to make with 
a straight face (and thus the assertion damages the court’s repu-
tation and perceived legitimacy). Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
gives the court a third option: say that the statute is ambiguous, 
and thus that the matter must be remanded to the agency. This 
third option may be a low-cost course from the court’s perspective, 
because what constitutes ambiguity can itself be ambiguous;222 
the reputational consequences for the court are thus less severe 
than the ramifications of option (2). In this way, Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half gives a court with ideological preferences at odds 
with an agency’s an easy way to throw sand in the agency’s gears. 
We are mindful of this concern and understand why those 
who are skeptical of judicial review may believe that this risk cuts 
against enforcement of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. That said, 
we are not especially moved. If an agency, for instance, is worried 
about this sort of strategic judicial behavior, it can always argue 
in the alternative (that is, both assert that the statute is unam-
biguous and also explain why it would reach the same result even 
if the statute were ambiguous). In other words, although this con-
cern about judges should not be understated, it also should not be 
overstated; agencies have a “self-help” mechanism, even though 
they do not always opt to use it. Moreover, this third option 
availed to courts by Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is a strategy of 
questionable efficacy: if the agency prefers reading X to read-
ing Y, it still can adopt reading X as an exercise of interpretive 
discretion on remand. Perhaps a court in the last few months of 
an administration may view the third option as a way to run out 
the clock, in the hope that a different administration—with ideo-
logical preferences closer to the court’s—will take the reins be-
fore the remand proceedings are complete. We should note, 
though, that none of the Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases 
from the DC Circuit identified in our Online Appendix plausibly 
fit this pattern.223 
 
 221 Chevron, 467 US at 842–43. 
 222 See, for example, Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2118 (cited in note 8). 
 223 One such case, Jacoby v National Labor Relations Board, 233 F3d 611 (DC Cir 
2000), was handed down less than six weeks before the end of the Clinton administration 
and the beginning of the presidency of George W. Bush. We doubt, though, that Jacoby is 
an example of strategic behavior by a court that was ideologically adverse to the agency 
and stalling for time. First, the relevant agency—the National Labor Relations Board—is 
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V.  IMPLEMENTING CHEVRON STEP ONE-AND-A-HALF 
Thus far, we have argued that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half 
is a distinct doctrine—consistent with, but not dictated by, the 
justifications proffered in (and for) Chevron itself. We have also 
argued that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases may continue to 
arise even if agency lawyers are aware of the doctrine: there are 
reasons rooted in ambivalence as well as strategy why agency ac-
tors may insist that a statute is unambiguous even though such 
insistence works to the agency’s disadvantage in litigation. Fi-
nally, we have argued that Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is an 
appropriate response to agency protestations of statutory clar-
ity—though with the consequence that in some cases the doc-
trine may give agencies the option of forcing a judicial decision 
at Chevron Step One. 
Here we address three ancillary questions. First, in what cir-
cumstances should Chevron Step One-and-a-Half be triggered? 
Second, what sort of remedy is appropriate in Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half cases? And third, even if Chevron Step One-and-a-
Half is sensible prudentially, can it be justified jurisprudentially? 
Our views on the first two questions remain tentative—and the 
DC Circuit itself has yet to arrive at firm answers to either. As to 
the third question, we acknowledge that Chevron Step One-and-
a-Half is—for better or worse—“administrative common law,” 
without a firm anchor in the text of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act224 (APA). And yet so too (and no less) is Chevron itself. 
So long as we have a Chevron doctrine, we think that Chevron 
 
an independent agency whose members serve five-year terms, and Clinton-appointed 
Democratic members continued to constitute a majority of the Board for months after 
Bush’s inauguration. (Indeed, the Board did not become majority Republican until Janu-
ary 2002.) See John D. Schulz, Changing Faces (JOC, Oct 20, 2002), online at 
http://www.joc.com/trucking-logistics/changing-faces_20021020.html (visited Apr 9, 2017) 
(Perma archive unavailable); Board Members since 1935 (National Labor Relations 
Board), archived at http://perma.cc/55Y9-CE94. This was thus not a case in which delaying 
a resolution for a few months until a new administration took power was likely to change 
the result. Second, Jacoby is a case that does not map easily onto ideological lines: unlike 
an employee-versus-employer case (in which one might expect the Board’s more liberal mem-
bers to be more sympathetic toward the employee), and unlike a union-versus-employer case 
(in which one might expect the Board’s more liberal members to be more sympathetic to-
ward the union), Jacoby was an employee-versus-union case. The NLRB’s decision had the 
support of one of its two Republican members at the time, see generally Plumbers Local 342 
(Contra Costa Electric), 329 NLRB 688 (1999), and the DC Circuit’s unanimous opinion 
was issued by an ideologically diverse panel including two Reagan appointees (Judge 
Stephen Williams and Judge David Sentelle) as well as one Clinton appointee (Judge 
Judith Rogers). Jacoby, 233 F3d at 613. 
 224 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended at 5 USC § 551 et seq. 
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Step One-and-a-Half plays an important role in preventing the 
Chevron framework from being flipped on its head. 
A. Ambiguity about Ambiguity 
The easiest Chevron Step One-and-a-Half cases are the ones 
in which an agency says that “the statute unambiguously means 
X” or says that “the statute is ambiguous—it allows both X and 
Y—and we choose X as a matter of discretion.” Such cases are not 
uncommon.225 Nor, however, are such cases universal: oftentimes 
an agency’s preamble or decision will lie somewhere between 
these two extremes.226 
One possible response is for the court to apply a “magic 
words” approach: unless the agency explicitly says that the stat-
ute is ambiguous, or explicitly says that it would reach the same 
result if the statute were ambiguous, then the court will not afford 
deference to the agency at Chevron Step Two. At the other ex-
treme, the court could apply a “benefit of the doubt” approach: 
 
 225 See, for example, Environmental Protection Agency, Air Quality Plans; Florida; 
Infrastructure Requirements for the 2012 PM2.5 National Ambient Air Quality Standard, 
81 Fed Reg 50416, 50418 (2016), amending 40 CFR Part 52: 
EPA therefore believes that while the timing requirement in section 110(a)(1) is 
unambiguous, some of the other statutory provisions are ambiguous. In particular, 
EPA believes that the list of required elements for infrastructure SIP submissions 
provided in section 110(a)(2) contains ambiguities concerning what is required for 
inclusion in an infrastructure SIP submission. 
See also Securities and Exchange Commission, Disclosure of Payments by Resource Ex-
traction Issuers, 81 Fed Reg 49360, 49386 n 351 (2016), amending various sections of CFR 
Title 17: 
We acknowledge that the statutory interpretation arguments we identify do not 
demonstrate an unambiguous Congressional intent to require public disclosure. 
. . . We believe that, at a minimum, Congress provided the Commission with dis-
cretionary authority. As such, based on our assessment of the record evidence 
and our weighing of the various policy considerations, we have determined to 
exercise that discretion by requiring public disclosure of each issuer’s annual 
report on Form SD. 
See also Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Procedures for Conducting Hearings on 
Conformance with the Acceptance Criteria in Combined Licenses, 81 Fed Reg 43266, 
43278 (2016) (“[T]he statutory language is not clear and unambiguous.”). 
 226 In the polar bear case, for example, counsel for the Fish and Wildlife Service “con-
ceded at oral argument that the agency does not seek deference to its interpretation of the 
definition of an endangered species under step two of the Chevron test and instead relies 
exclusively on a plain-meaning interpretation of the ESA.” In re Polar Bear Endangered 
Species Act Listing and § 4(d) Rule Litigation, 748 F Supp 2d 19, 29 (DDC 2010). The 
district court noted, though, that absent this concession it would have been difficult to 
determine whether the Service considered the statute to be clear or whether it considered 
the statute to be ambiguous and had adopted its interpretation as an exercise of discretion. 
See id at 29 n 16. 
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unless the agency explicitly says that the statute is unambiguous, 
then the court will assume that the agency is exercising its dis-
cretion. A third possibility is a “mind reading” tack: if the agency 
is ambiguous as to whether it thinks the statute is ambiguous, 
then the court will do its best to divine the agency’s view. A fourth 
route is an “ask the attorney” approach: when in doubt, the court 
can ask the agency’s lawyer at oral argument whether the agency 
would hew to its position if the statute were ambiguous. 
We think there is much to be said for the “magic words” ap-
proach, which would encourage the authors of agency preambles 
to make clear to other agency officials, OIRA, and the public when 
the agency is exercising policy discretion. We think there is much 
less to be said for the “ask the attorney” approach, which would 
do little to deter the sort of strategic behavior discussed above. 
Agencies (and agency lawyers) would then be able to say in their 
preambles that a particular policy is compelled by Congress, and 
only in the event of litigation (and, even then, only in the event 
that a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half argument arises) would the 
agency have to take ownership of its choice. 
Ultimately, the choice among triggering rules comes down to 
how we want to allocate interpretive and explanatory burdens. 
The “magic words” approach imposes a burden on preamble writ-
ers to say at the outset that the agency is exercising its discretion. 
The “benefit of the doubt” approach imposes a burden on other 
actors—within the agency, elsewhere within the executive 
branch, and outside the government—to understand that any-
thing other than an unambiguous statement of unambiguity 
amounts to an exercise of discretion. The “mind reading” tack 
places the burden on the court to divine the agency’s intent—but 
also on the other actors within and outside the agency to deter-
mine whether the agency is or is not exercising interpretive dis-
cretion. The “ask the attorney” approach places an even heavier 
burden on the other actors within and outside the agency, who 
now must divine the agency’s intent not on the basis of the past 
statements, but on the basis of future ones. 
In some cases, the DC Circuit appears to follow something 
like the “benefit of the doubt” approach. For instance, in Braintree 
Electric Light Department v Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion,227 the court rejected a Chevron Step One-and-a-Half attack 
by stating that so “long as the text is ambiguous and the agency 
 
 227 667 F3d 1284 (DC Cir 2012). 
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does not insist that it is clear, a reasonable interpretation will 
warrant our deference.”228 This raises the obvious concern that the 
preamble to an agency rule may suggest to nonlawyers within and 
outside the agency that the statutory language is clear, while still 
leaving the agency wiggle room in the event of a Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half challenge. In other cases, the DC Circuit appears 
to impose a higher bar: for example, the court in Peter Pan said 
that “Chevron step 2 deference is reserved for those instances 
when an agency recognizes that the Congress’s intent is not plain 
from the statute’s face.”229 Our modest suggestion is that the DC 
Circuit should clarify the ambiguity as to how it will treat ambi-
guity about ambiguity. If the “benefit of the doubt” approach is 
the governing regime, then relevant actors within and outside the 
agency should know that any time the agency does not say that 
the statute is clear, the agency is eligible for Chevron Step Two 
deference. Such a bright-line rule—clearly stated by the courts—
would go some way toward reducing opportunities for agency ac-
tors to suggest one thing in the rulemaking process and another 
in litigation. 
B. Choosing a Remedy 
A second question in the implementation of Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half is the choice of remedy: If an agency runs afoul of 
the Step One-and-a-Half doctrine, should a reviewing court (1) let 
it go, (2) remand without vacatur, (3) remand with vacatur, or 
(4) impose the opposite of the agency’s preferred rule? For all the 
reasons explained above, we think option (1) is a bad one. Choos-
ing between options (2) and (3), however, is more complicated. 
Administrative remedies have been largely overlooked in the 
scholarly literature—to the detriment of the field.230 In short, 
§ 706 of the APA says that “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
 
 228 Id at 1288–89 (emphasis added). See also Labor, Mine Safety and Health Admin-
istration v National Cement Co of California, 494 F3d 1066, 1074 (DC Cir 2007) (focusing 
on an agency assertion that “the definition of ‘coal or other mine’ plainly includes a road 
such as the one at issue”); Arizona v Thompson, 281 F3d 248, 253 (DC Cir 2002) (focusing 
on an agency assertion that “the TANF legislation does not permit it being designated as 
the primary program”) (ellipses and emphasis omitted). 
 229 Peter Pan, 471 F3d at 1354 (emphasis added). 
 230 See Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 255 (cited in note 12) (noting “systematic inatten-
tion to remedial questions” in administrative law). 
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law.”231 Despite this language, the DC Circuit has concluded—al-
beit not without controversy232—that not all unlawful agency ac-
tions must be vacated. Instead, sometimes a court will remand 
without vacating under what has come to be known as the Allied–
Signal doctrine, so named for the 1993 case (Allied–Signal, Inc v 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission233) in which it was 
articulated. 
Under the Allied–Signal doctrine, “[t]he decision whether to 
vacate depends on ‘the seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and 
thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly) and 
the disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself 
be changed.’”234 The facts of Allied–Signal illustrate how the doc-
trine works. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission promul-
gated a rule to recoup some of the costs incurred when the agency 
provides services to regulated parties. Allied-Signal challenged 
that regulation as arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the 
statute because the agency did not adequately consider the ability 
of certain types of companies to “pass through” charges to con-
sumers.235 The Commission had exempted certain nonprofit insti-
tutions from the rule because they could not readily pass through 
charges to consumers, but had not considered whether other en-
tities were similarly restricted—which rendered the rule a viola-
tion of the “reasoned decision-making” requirement.236 The DC 
Circuit concluded, however, that vacatur was not required. After 
all, it was possible that the Commission could “explain how the 
principles supporting an exemption for educational institutions 
do not justify a similar exemption” for other types of entities.237 
And “[a]t the same time, the consequences of vacating may be 
quite disruptive,” especially because “the Commission would 
need to refund all . . . fees collected from those [entities]; in ad-
dition it evidently would be unable to recover those fees under a 
 
 231 5 USC § 706. 
 232 See, for example, Comcast Corp v Federal Communications Commission, 579 F3d 
1, 10 (DC Cir 2009) (Randolph concurring) (“I continue to believe that whenever a review-
ing court finds an administrative rule or order unlawful, the Administrative Procedure 
Act requires the court to vacate the agency’s action.”). See also generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 
Ariz St L J 599 (2004). 
 233 988 F2d 146 (DC Cir 1993). 
 234 Id at 150–51, quoting International Union, United Mine Workers of America v 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, 920 F2d 960, 967 (DC Cir 1990). 
 235 Allied–Signal, 988 F2d at 148–49. 
 236 Id at 150. 
 237 Id at 151. 
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later-enacted rule.”238 The Allied–Signal doctrine has also been 
adopted beyond the DC Circuit.239 The Supreme Court, however, 
has not addressed its legality.240 
The Allied–Signal doctrine could be combined with Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half. For instance, in Coalition for Common 
Sense in Government Procurement v United States,241 the court 
confronted a Department of Defense regulation involving “Fed-
eral Ceiling Prices” (that is, the highest amount federal agencies 
can pay contractors) that the agency claimed was mandated by 
Congress.242 The court disagreed with the agency that the agency 
did not have discretion and, under Prill, concluded that the court 
could not determine whether the agency’s regulation could none-
theless be upheld.243 Rather than vacate the regulation, however, 
the court applied Allied–Signal to conclude that the regulation 
should be remanded only.244 Likewise, in the polar bear illustra-
tion presented above, the court concluded that the agency wrongly 
disclaimed discretion, but rather than vacate the agency’s rule, 
the court simply remanded for additional proceedings.245 
There is much to be said for this sort of approach—making 
an agency start the regulatory process anew imposes massive 
costs, and perhaps the disciplining effects of Chevron Step 
 
 238 Id. See also Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable 
Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 Duke L J 291, 374–75 (2003). See also generally 
Kristina Daugirdas, Note, Evaluating Remand without Vacatur: A New Judicial Remedy 
for Defective Agency Rulemakings, 80 NYU L Rev 278 (2005). 
 239 See Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 307 (cited in note 12) (“Other circuits—including the 
First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal—have followed the D.C. Circuit’s lead.”). 
See also, for example, Natural Resources Defense Council v United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, 808 F3d 556, 584 (2d Cir 2015) (finding an agency action to be arbitrary 
and capricious and remanding without vacating); California Communities against Toxics 
v United States Environmental Protection Agency, 688 F3d 989, 992 (9th Cir 2012) (per 
curiam) (“A flawed rule need not be vacated.”). 
 240 See Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 308 (cited in note 12). 
 241 671 F Supp 2d 48 (DDC 2009). 
 242 Id at 53–54. 
 243 See id at 55–56 (explaining that “[h]aving concluded that the statutory language 
does not speak to precisely how the Department should implement the statute, the Court 
ordinarily would move to Chevron step two,” but stating that it accepted the plaintiff’s 
argument that it could not “do so here because the rule’s preamble reveals that the agency 
mistakenly believed that Congress mandated the requirement of a manufacturer refund”). 
 244 See id at 59. 
 245 See In re Polar Bear, 748 F Supp 2d at 30: 
[T]he Court hereby remands the Listing Rule to the agency for the limited purpose 
of providing additional explanation for the legal basis of its listing determination, 
and for such further action as it may wish to take in light of the Court’s finding 
that the definition of an “endangered species” under the ESA is ambiguous. 
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One-and-a-Half can be achieved without the need for such costs, 
at least sometimes. Thus, a reviewing court, as a matter of its 
equitable judgment, could determine whether the case-specific 
costs or the broader institutional values should win out. The prob-
lem, however, is that courts may not be well positioned to strike 
that balance, especially because much of what happens during the 
rulemaking process occurs in a “black box.”246 Hence, it may be 
difficult to know just how innocent a mistake is. 
Moreover, the costs imposed by vacatur are arguably part of 
the deterrence effect of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. Indeed, 
courts could go a step further and establish a rule of the following 
sort: if a statute could mean X or Y and the agency insists that 
the statute unambiguously means X, then the penalty for the 
agency’s failure to acknowledge ambiguity is that the court will 
impose Y. We anticipate that under such a regime, agencies 
would much more readily acknowledge their own discretion. In-
deed, the total costs of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half remands 
may decline as such remands become rarer and rarer.247 Yet this 
“super penalty” approach makes much more sense on a white-
board than in the real world. If an agency promulgates an 
eighty-page rule on a complicated subject based on its view that 
a statute means X, would a court be competent to write its own 
version of the rule on the view that the statute means Y? We are 
doubtful.248 
At bottom, we think the remedy question defies easy answer. 
Our intuition is that, given the high costs of vacatur, a context-
dependent approach makes the most sense here—with vacatur 
reserved for cases that cannot be chalked up to innocent agency 
error. And yet we acknowledge that the high costs of vacatur 
might also counsel in favor of invoking that remedy more readily 
so as to achieve optimal deterrence. 
 
 
 
 
 246 Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 87 Cornell L Rev 486, 488, 514–15 (2002). 
 247 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 
J Polit Econ 169 (1968) (theorizing a model for the optimal choice of punishment in order 
to deter wrongdoing while minimizing social loss). 
 248 Consider too that the higher the cost to the court of a Chevron Step One-and-a-
Half remand, the more reluctant the court will be to invoke the doctrine. For that reason, 
a variant of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half that forces the court to rewrite the agency’s rule 
on its own may be a less effective deterrent than a milder version. 
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C. Chevron Step One-and-a-Half as Administrative  
Common Law 
At last we come to a question that arguably should have come 
much earlier: Even if Chevron Step One-and-a-Half makes sense 
as a prudential matter, can courts justify the doctrine as a juris-
prudential matter? After all, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is a 
judge-made doctrine, not derived from the text of the APA or any 
other statute. Do courts have the authority to make up a doctrine 
like this on their own? 
The reality is that sometimes for these higher-order ques-
tions of administrative law, textual sources do not have much to 
say. For instance, although both Chenery I and State Farm could, 
in a pinch, be tied to the APA’s bar on arbitrary and capricious 
agency action, the nexus is not self-evident. At the same time, 
however, what agencies are allowed to do has also expanded. 
Chevron itself, for instance, is hardly compelled by any statutory 
source, and, indeed, it may be in some tension with the APA.249 In 
short, one cannot be asymmetric about these things: if deference 
doctrines are allowed to stand (a question we leave for another 
day), then doctrines that help police those deference doctrines 
must also be allowed to expand. There no doubt is a bit of “admin-
istrative common law” in Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, but that 
alone is not necessarily a reason to reject the doctrine.250 If agen-
cies are to be trusted with Chevron powers for reasons of political 
accountability and expertise, then Chevron Step One-and-a-
Half—which forces agencies to take accountability for their ac-
tions and pushes them to employ their expertise—protects the in-
tegrity of the Chevron framework. 
Our tentative defense of Chevron Step One-and-a-Half still 
leaves the doctrine open to attack on grounds that it violates the 
principle that reviewing courts are “generally not free” to impose 
procedural requirements on agencies unless those requirements 
stem from the APA or some other statutory source.251 This princi-
ple—known as the Vermont Yankee rule for the case, Vermont 
 
 249 See, for example, Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1211 
(2015) (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (“Heedless of the original design of the APA, 
we have developed an elaborate law of deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutes 
and regulations.”). 
 250 See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 
Geo Wash L Rev 1293 (2012). 
 251 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 
435 US 519, 524 (1978). 
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Yankee Nuclear Power Corp v Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc,252 in which it was announced—would seem to be in some ten-
sion with Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. After all, the require-
ment that an agency acknowledge ambiguity in the relevant stat-
ute as a prerequisite for deference at Chevron Step Two might be 
described as an additional procedural requirement ginned up by 
the DC Circuit and found nowhere in any statutory source. 
We have no knockdown rebuttal to the Vermont Yankee ob-
jection, though we do have at least two responses. First, Chevron 
Step One-and-a-Half is at least arguably justified on the basis of 
Chenery I, which predates Vermont Yankee by several decades.253 
And second, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is at least arguably a 
logical extension of Chevron’s holding that courts should defer in 
instances when an agency enjoys a relative advantage in terms of 
electoral accountability and expertise. If judges can decide that 
agencies will receive deference under certain circumstances, then 
presumably the same judges can decide in what circumstances 
such deference ought not to be forthcoming. Our modest sugges-
tion is that so long as they exist, deference-limiting doctrines 
should be fitted to the values that motivated Chevron in the first 
place. And by our lights, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half meets that 
criterion. 
CONCLUSION 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half is an important element of judi-
cial review of agency statutory interpretations in the DC Circuit—
and there are at least signs of it taking hold in courts beyond the 
District of Columbia’s “ten Miles square.”254 And yet so far the doc-
trine has largely escaped academic attention: casebooks and (with 
few exceptions) commentators have passed over the gap between 
Chevron Step One and Chevron Step Two. We seek to fill this void 
by presenting the first comprehensive treatment of Chevron Step 
 
 252 435 US 519 (1978). 
 253 See Part II.B. Of course, some may grumble that this defense of Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half just kicks the can down the road. After all, why is Chenery I consistent with 
the APA? See, for example, Bagley, 117 Colum L Rev at 293–95 (cited in note 12) (ques-
tioning whether a broad view of Chenery I comports with the APA’s instruction that courts 
apply harmless-error principles). Yet Chenery I has a very strong claim to stare decisis—
it has been the law for more than seventy years. Equally important, it also predates the 
APA, so presumably Congress legislated against the Chenery I backdrop. See, for example, 
Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677, 698–99 (1979) (“[O]ur evaluation of congres-
sional action . . . must take into account its contemporary legal context.”). 
 254 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 17. 
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One-and-a-Half. We ask: Why does the doctrine exist, and are 
Chevron Step One-and-a-Half’s critics correct that the doctrine’s 
application “outstrips its rationale”?255 
On our view, before one can answer those questions, it is es-
sential to confront the puzzle at the heart of Chevron Step One-
and-a-Half: Why do these cases still arise? One might have ex-
pected that Prill would be a one-off, and that agencies would 
quickly learn to insulate their rules from Step One-and-a-Half 
attacks. And yet the last thirty years have proven that expecta-
tion to be incorrect. Perhaps the reason is that agencies are slow 
to learn (in which case they would have to be very slow indeed!). 
We believe, though, that any explanation sounding in agency ig-
norance is incomplete. Agency actors have strategic reasons to as-
sert that statutes are unambiguous even when such assertions 
increase the likelihood of a remand. Central to our argument is 
the fact that reviewing courts are not the only relevant veto play-
ers in the administrative process: actors within and outside the 
agency are, too. Moreover, agency actors are not trying to max-
imize only their probability of success in litigation; they also may 
care about the allocation of credit and blame between themselves 
and Congress, as well as the durability of their policies once their 
successors grab the reins. 
We are, of course, not the first to observe that agencies are 
themselves multifaceted bodies, that agencies are concerned not 
only about courts but also about OIRA, or that agencies seek to 
entrench their preferred policies so that their work is not undone 
by successors. We are, however, the first to explain how these con-
siderations interact with Chevron Step One-and-a-Half. And these 
strategic considerations not only help to explain why Chevron Step 
One-and-a-Half cases continue to arise, but also may help to jus-
tify the doctrine’s continued existence. 
 
 255 PDK Laboratories Inc v United States Drug Enforcement Administration, 362 F3d 
786, 809 (DC Cir 2004) (Roberts concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
